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“[L]awyers have expended much paper and ink learnedly struggling 
to discover some elegant and hitherto obscure common denominator 
among the courts’ products.  Like medieval theologians, they avoid 
confrontation with their system’s fatal paradoxes by immersing their 
thoughts in trivial comparisons and nice distinctions.”1 
 
“The notion that the right to vote and other manifestations of citi-
zenship might reflect defeat for a group rather than victory is not one 
that many of us are likely to immediately realize, but it is one that 
American Indian history forces us all to consider.”2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1760s and 1770s, British Parliament passed laws requiring 
American colonists to pay taxes on everything from playing cards to 
newspapers to tea.3  Parliament also required the colonists to house 
the British soldiers sent to enforce these taxes.4  The vast majority of 
colonists neither consented to nor had a hand in drafting these laws, 
 
 1. RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN 
TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY xii (1980). 
 2. AMERICAN INDIANS AND U.S. POLITICS: A COMPANION READER 49 (John M. 
Meyer ed. 2002). 
 3. See CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 91–96 (1944). 
 4. See id. at 96. 
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and these laws only applied to American colonists.  No one in 
Parliament, or anywhere else in the British Empire, shared the 
burden of these laws.  The situation eventually led the colonists to 
reject British authority, to the cry of “[n]o taxation without represen-
tation . . . [!]”5 
One hundred and seventy years later, two citizens6 of the Mohave-
Apache Tribe faced similar political exclusion but sought a different 
result—incorporation into the opposing sovereign instead of 
separation from it.7  Frank Harrison and Harry Austin both lived on 
the Fort McDowell Reservation.  Harrison had risked his life in the 
U.S. military during World War II.  Both paid taxes to the State of 
Arizona and the federal government.  Shortly after the war, Harrison 
and Austin went to the Maricopa County Recorder’s office to register 
to vote.  The County Recorder refused to register them, stating that 
they were wards of the federal government and therefore lacked the 
requisite competency.  Harrison and Austin responded by suing to 
enforce their right to vote, resulting in Harrison v. Laveen, the seminal 
case affirming the right of reservation citizens8 to vote in state 
elections.9 
Similar decisions followed,10 but for many years, most tribal citi-
zens did not vote in non-tribal elections.11  Some did not vote because 
anti-tribal interests went to great lengths to discourage or prohibit 
 
 5. Id. at 97. 
 6. Many people, tribal and non-tribal, use the term “member” to refer to 
individuals formally enrolled in a tribe as part of the tribe’s body politic.  Members of 
a sovereign body politic are more accurately referred to as “citizens,” at least in a 
democratic context.  Because vocabulary influences perception, and the use of the 
term “member” marginalizes the sovereign aspect of tribes, this paper will use the 
term “tribal citizen.”  Cf. infra note 8. 
 7. See Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456, 457–58 (Ariz. 1948) (holding that 
Indians have the right to vote in Arizona elections for state and federal officers). 
 8. For purposes of this article, “reservation citizens” are reservation residents 
who are also citizens of, i.e. “enrolled in,” the tribe that governs the reservation on 
which they live.  “Tribal citizens” are individuals who are formally enrolled in a tribal 
government but might live on or off their tribe’s reservation.  “Non-citizen Indians” 
are individuals who live on a reservation other than the reservation of the tribe in 
which they are enrolled (for instance, a Navaho citizen who lives on the Rosebud 
Sioux Reservation).  Cf. supra note 6. 
 9. Harrison, 196 P.2d at 463. 
 10. Little Thunder v. South Dakota, 518 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1975); Prince v. Bd. 
of Educ. of Cent. Consol. Indep. Sch. No. 22, 543 P.2d 1176 (1975); Montoya v. 
Bolack, 372 P.2d 387 (1962); cf. Acosta v. San Diego County, 272 P.2d 92 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1954). 
 11. See infra notes 12–14.  “Non-tribal elections” refers to national, state, and 
non-tribal local elections collectively. 
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voting by tribal citizens.12  Others felt voting in state and federal 
elections inappropriate because they did not view themselves as 
citizens of either sovereign.13 
Things have changed, however.  Since the return of tribal veter-
ans from World War II,14 the Civil Rights Era’s campaign against race-
based distinctions,15 the advent of successful tribal gaming enterpris-
 
 12. See DANIEL MCCOOL ET AL., NATIVE VOTE: AMERICAN INDIANS, THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT, AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE 10–20 (2007) (discussing strategies by states to 
prevent or limit Indian voting); Danna R. Jackson, Eighty Years of Indian Voting: A Call 
to Protect Indian Voting Rights, 65 MONT. L. REV. 269, 275–81 (2004) (discussing the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 which prohibits any individual action or law denying or 
abridging voting rights on account of race or color); Jeanette Wolfley, Jim Crow, 
Indian Style: The Disenfranchisement of Native Americans, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 167, 167–
92 (1991) (discussing various techniques used to exclude Indians from voting). 
 13. See Robert B. Porter-Odawi, Two Kinds of Indians, Two Kinds of Indian Nation 
Sovereignty: A Surreply to Professor Lavelle, 11  KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 629, 643 (2002) 
[hereinafter Porter, Two Kinds of Indians] (“[W]hy so many Senecas do not vote in the 
White Man’s elections was because we take pretty seriously the fact that we have our 
own nation, our own elections, and our own sovereignty.”); Robert B. Porter, The 
Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act 
of Forcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107, 
128 (1999) [hereinafter Porter, The Demise] (“‘This was a violation of our sovereignty.  
Our Citizenship was in our own nations. . . . There was no great rush among my 
people to go out and vote in the white man’s elections.’”) (quoting Tuscarora Chief 
Clinton Rickard in Laurence Hauptman, Congress and the American Indian, in EXILED IN 
THE LAND OF THE FREE 3263 (Oren Lyons & John Mohawk eds., 1991); David Wilkins, 
An Inquiry into Indigenous Political Participation: Implications for Tribal Sovereignty, 9 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 732, 734 (2000) (“Part of the reason for the reluctance or refusal of 
political scientists to examine indigenous political participation rests on the fact that 
politically tribal nations, generally—although this is changing for some tribes—do 
not consider themselves to be part of the pluralistic mosaic that is predominant in 
political science literature.  Tribes perceive of themselves not only as pre-
constitutional entities, but more importantly, as extra-constitutional polities.”); see also 
THEODORE W. TAYLOR, THE STATES AND THEIR INDIAN CITIZENS 91 n.30A (1972) (citing 
Letter from Edward C. Hinckley, former Commissioner of Indian Affairs for Maine, to 
Thomas Tureen (March 24, 1972)) (“Some Maine Indians publicly opposed the 
removal of the constitutional exception and the granting of the right to vote because 
they saw it ‘as a step to[]wards the termination of the special Indian-State relation-
ship.’”) (quoting Letter from Edward C. Hinckley, former Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs for Maine, to Thomas Tureen (Mar. 24, 1972)). 
 14. See MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 9–10 (“Indian veterans, returning home 
after service in World War II, played a pivotal role in fighting for the right to vote.”); 
U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT 
OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 32–40 (1947) (noting that many 
barriers to right of citizenship and its privileges, including voting, were removed after 
World War II). 
 15. See COLIN G. CALLOWAY, FIRST PEOPLES: A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY OF AMERICAN 
INDIAN HISTORY 459–60 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing the organization of the American 
Indian Movement in the summer of 1968); JOANE NAGEL, AMERICAN INDIAN ETHNIC 
RENEWAL: RED POWER AND THE RESURGENCE OF IDENTITY AND CULTURE 95, 130–37, 
4
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es,16 and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act’s imposition of state 
compacting requirements,17 tribes and tribal citizens have become 
more and more involved in local, state, and national politics.18  Today, 
tribes and tribal citizens vote, donate, lobby, and serve in elected 
office more than ever.19  Tribal leaders formed the National Congress 
of American Indians (NCAI) in 1944 in order to encourage such 
participation—at the national level at first, but later pushing state 
involvement.20  Political parties and candidates have increased the 
time and attention paid to tribal populations as races tighten in 
battleground states.21  As of July 2009, the National Caucus of Native 
American State Legislators listed thirty enrolled tribal citizens serving 
 
158–84 (1996) (discussing the Civil Rights Era’s influence on the increase in 
individuals identifying as Native American and the Red Power movement); John P. 
LaVelle, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Indian Participation in American Politics: 
A Reply to Professor Porter, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 533, 535-51 (2001)) (criticizing 
Professor Porter’s view of the Red Power Movement and arguing its positive effects on 
Indian rights); Porter, The Demise, supra note 13, at 143–46 (noting the positive effects 
of the Red Power movement and the American Indian Movement). 
 16. James Dao, Indians’ New Money Buys Lobbying Power, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1998, 
at B1, (“Indians, of course, have been coming to Washington for as long as it has 
existed, to talk over treaty rights and other issues.  And since the early 1990’s at least, 
tribes have been using newfound gambling wealth to expand their political muscle.”); 
Wilkins, supra note 13, at 732 (“[S]ince the late 1980s, and largely as a result of Indian 
gaming, there now exists a situation where some tribal governments, acting, they 
argue, in a sovereign capacity, are not only proactively supporting state and federal 
office seekers (in addition to tribal office seekers) by making significant financial 
contributions to American political campaigns (in addition to their own tribal 
campaigns), but are also weighing in on issues—like the national tobacco litiga-
tion—that seem unrelated to tribal affairs . . . .  [G]ambling wealth is providing some 
tribes with opportunities to employ skilled lobbyists, savvy public relations firms, and 
make large campaign contributions . . . in a manner heretofore unknown.”). 
 17. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (hereinafter “IGRA”) requires tribes to 
enter an agreement with the surrounding state (a “compact”) before beginning 
gaming activities.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2006).  See also Porter, The Demise, supra 
note 13, at 150–51 (“One of the main reasons for this increase in political activity 
appears to be the need to safeguard gaming rights, a phenomenon that has emerged 
in the last ten years to make a few select Indian nations extremely wealthy and 
allowed many more to generate modest income to support tribal government 
operations.”) (citing Tim Johnson, The Dealer’s Edge: Gaming in the Path of Native 
America, 12 NATIVE AMERICAS, 16 (1995)). 
 18. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text.  
 19. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text. 
 20. THOMAS W. COWGER, THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS: THE 
FOUNDING YEARS 9, 44, 64–65 (1999). 
 21. MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 176–83; National Congress of American 
Indians’ 2008 Native Vote Campaign, The American Indian Vote: A Brief History & 
Current Obstacles, http://nativevote.org/images/docs/ (follow “The American 
Indian Vote: A Brief History 2004 pdf” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
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as elected state officials.22  Many represent districts that coincide with 
reservation territory.23  
Some scholars have sternly attacked tribal citizen participation in 
state and federal politics, asserting that such participation undermines 
tribal sovereignty.24  Others have staunchly defended such participa-
tion, welcoming the benefits participation has brought and asserting 
those benefits as proof that the best way to defend tribal interests is 
through such participation.25  In a recent press release, NCAI 
President Joe A. Garcia said, “[i]ncreasing civic participation among 
American Indian and Alaska Native communities is imperative to 
protecting sovereignty and ensuring Native issues are addressed on 
every level of government.”26  
Through it all, tribes and tribal citizens have asserted—with vary-
ing levels of success—that the non-tribal laws they participate in 
making do not, or should not, apply to reservation territory or 
residents.  As a consequence of this paradigm, reservation citizens 
who participate in state politics end up imposing laws and duties on 
citizens of the surrounding state—laws and duties which reservation 
citizens generally have no obligation to obey or subsidize.  In this way, 
tribes and tribal citizens living on reservations assume the same 
position as British Parliament of the 1760s vis-à-vis American Colon-
ists.  A position more diametrically opposed to basic American 
political principles—contrary to the basic shared American parable—
could not exist.  Participation by reservation residents appears unfair 
when viewed in light of universally-accepted American political 
concepts,27 a point still routinely asserted by opponents of tribal 
 
 22. List from Linda Murakami Sikkema, Director, National Caucus of State 
Legislators, State-Tribal Institute, to Michael D. Oeser (July 7, 2009; on file with 
author); National Caucus of Native American State Legislators, http://www.native
americanlegislators.org/Public%20Documents/Caucus%20Membership.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2009) (copy on file with author).  This figure excludes representatives 
from Alaska and Hawaii.  Adding these states, the total rises to 35. 
 23. Survey done by Cate Kellett and Melissa Holds the Enemy at the Great Lakes 
Indian Law Center in June, July, and August 2009 (on file with author). 
 24. Porter, Two Kinds of Indians, supra note 13, at 635–36, 639, 647–49; Porter, 
The Demise, supra note 13, at 169–70, 173–74. 
 25. MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 194; see generally LaVelle, supra note 15 
(arguing that the most appropriate means to assert tribal interests is to actively 
participate in state and federal politics). 
 26. Press Release, Nat’l Congress of Am. Indians, NCAI Rolls Out 2008 Native 
Vote Initiative at Annual Convention in Denver (Nov. 12, 2007). 
 27. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, 94TH CONG., FINAL REPORT 579 
(Comm. Print 1977) (“Reservation Indians would be citizens of the State but be 
wholly free of State law and State taxation even though they participate in the 
6
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sovereignty.28  
This article focuses on the relationship between participation by 
reservation citizens in state and federal politics, and sovereign 
authority over reservation lands and residents.  The article points out 
similarities between the theoretical tensions faced by the Founders 
relating to multiple sovereignties, and the dilemma faced by tribes 
today.  This article identifies accelerating trends in the area of tribal 
political participation and analyzes them in light of four fundamental 
American political principals: (1) legitimate government derives its 
authority from the consent of the governed, (2) participation in a 
democratic political process constitutes consent to be governed by 
that process, (3) human beings inherently seek power as a result of 
self-interest, and (4) one sovereign will succumb to another where the 
two compete to exert authority over the same people, territory, or 
both.  This article looks to the debates leading up to the ratification of 
the present U.S. Constitution for guidance on these principles.  This 
approach provides a common political and ethical framework that 
most Americans understand and accept—a useful platform from 
which to advocate for tribal sovereignty to non-tribal audiences, 
including legislatures and courts. 
This article ultimately asserts that, like the inhabitants of ancient 
Troy dragging a wooden horse inside the gates, reservation citizens 
are embracing the demise of tribal governments if they continue to 
participate in federal and state elections without taking steps to avoid 
 
creation of State law and State taxing schemes.  In short, reservation Indians would 
have all the benefits of citizenship and none of its burdens.  On the other hand, non-
Indian citizens of the State would have no say in the creation of Indian law and policy 
on the reservation, even if they were residents of the reservation, and yet be subject to 
tribal jurisdiction.  In short, non-Indians would have all the burdens of citizenship but 
none of the benefits.”); TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 91 (“Historically there were 
practical problems with Indians voting in State elections.  Indians living on a Federal 
reservation were frequently not subject to State or local laws while on the reservation.  
If they voted for State and county officials they participated in making laws or levying 
taxes not applicable to them but applicable to others.  This situation is still true and it 
raises bothersome questions of equity from the non-Indian point of view.”). 
 28. Cindy Yurth, Diné Racist, Anglo says, NAVAJO TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, at A1, 
available at http://www.navajotimes.com/news/2009/0409/041609racism.php; Cindy 
Yurth, Navajos Take Over Apache County Government, NAVAJO TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A4, 
available at http://www.navajotimes.com/news/2008/1108/110608apacheco.php; cf. 
Martin Reed, Candidates’ Opinions Vary on Tribal Boundary Lawsuit, WIND RIVER NEWS, 
Oct. 16, 2008, at 13; Apache County Board of Supervisors Issues Minutes of Oct. 16 Special 
Meeting, U.S. State News, Nov. 6, 2007, available at http://www.navajocountyaz.gov/
bos/minutes/2007/101607Min.pdf; (discussing that after election, in Apache County, 
“Navajos will hold a majority of elected offices”). 
7
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the sovereign conflict that results.  No one can deny that tribes and 
their citizens have had greater success in non-tribal politics in recent 
years, becoming better able to influence legislation and policy 
targeting tribes.29  However, by participating in non-tribal political 
processes, tribes and tribal citizens consent to state and federal 
jurisdiction over reservation lands and residents.  Such participation 
legitimizes present assertions of sovereignty within reservations, invites 
further assertions, undermines tribes’ ability to advocate against the 
exercise of non-tribal jurisdiction over reservation territory, and 
exacerbates the three-way conflict between tribal, state, and federal 
sovereignty.  Tribes have generally lost ground in this three-way 
conflict over time, suffering a piecemeal erosion of sovereignty similar 
to what The Founders thought would happen to the states absent 
clear, affirmative limitation of federal authority.  This pattern suggests 
that multiple-sovereignty problems are responsible for tribes’ 
sovereign losses and that addressing these problems may slow or halt 
those losses.  If tribes continue down the present path, competition 
between the three sovereigns will ultimately hollow out tribal 
sovereignty, implicitly or explicitly.  This article will show how 
participation-based analysis has played an increasing role in U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions reducing tribal sovereignty.  Moreover, this 
article will suggest that a slight shift in focus in this reasoning—from 
how the denial of non-Indian participation in tribal politics limits 
tribal authority, to how the pursuit of participation by tribal peoples 
in non-tribal politics authorizes non-tribal authority—is a dangerous 
logical extension of this legal progression. 
Because the status quo will result in continued losses of tribal 
sovereignty, tribes and tribal citizens must make a tough choice today 
if they want any control over how these tensions resolve tomorrow: 
active incorporation into non-tribal governments or active separation 
from them.  Furthermore, the incorporate-or-separate decision must 
be made on two different levels—federal and state.  Important 
distinctions between the tribal-federal relationship and tribal-state 
relationship suggest a different result in each instance. 
Continued tribal participation at the federal level is likely in tri-
bes’ best interest.  Federal law-making with regard to tribes is unlikely 
to abate.  Because people governed by a particular political process 
have a right—and a reason—to participate in that process, tribes 
have a vested interest in participation in the federal law-making 
 
 29. See infra Part II.C.  
8
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process.  However, the need for continued federal participation 
makes establishing limits on federal authority imperative to avoiding 
continued losses of tribal sovereignty.  Fortunately, a successful model 
for limitation of federal power readily presents itself—the Tenth 
Amendment. 
In contrast, tribal participation in state political processes seems 
less imperative and less amenable to a stable limitation of power that 
would leave tribes more autonomous than not.  States generally have 
not legislated over tribes, making tribal participation in state political 
processes less necessary to protect tribal interests.30  Moreover, 
whereas a stable model for dual citizenship/authority already exists in 
the tribal-federal context, the same cannot be said for a three-way, 
tribal-state-federal division of citizenship/authority.  Even if a stable, 
consent-based model could be established, a three-way split could 
easily result in tribes losing further sovereignty.  This suggests the 
absence of a middle ground where tribal, state, and federal citizenship 
can meaningfully co-exist from a tribal perspective.  In the absence of 
a middle ground, tribes need to make a clear decision to incorporate 
or separate. 
Tribes choosing active incorporation could use the states’ desire 
for dominion over tribal lands to affirmatively preserve some, but 
probably not all, of the benefits tribes enjoy as separate sovereigns.  
Tribes choosing to separate from the state would have to give up any 
benefits realized through voting in non-tribal elections and service in 
non-tribal office, but could stem the erosion of their sovereignty, and 
possibly stabilize their relationship with surrounding states through 
intergovernmental agreements. 
While choosing incorporation or separation cannot involve an 
ethical imperative if individual autonomy is to be respected, making 
some choice very well may.  Asserting the ability to participate without 
being subjected to the products of that participation presents a 
hypocritical position that Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court will 
likely resolve to the detriment of tribes over time.  Continued 
participation creates reasons and opportunities for the federal 
legislature and courts to further erode tribal sovereignty, some of 
which may occur before tribes that choose to buttress their sovereign-
ty through political separation can do so effectively. 
 
 30. Even in those states that have legislated over tribes via Public Law 280, 
serious questions about the legitimacy of such legislation arise given that no tribe 
consented to the exercise of state legislative power.  See infra notes 129–32 and 
accompanying text. 
9
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Part II of this article will review the legal and historical develop-
ment of reservation citizens’ right to participate in federal and state 
politics.  This review will provide perspective on the extent of tribal 
political participation, and thus provide a basis for subsequent 
analysis.  The review will also give readers a basis for judging the costs 
and benefits of ending such participation.  Part II will then specifically 
examine the cases establishing this right to vote, placing them in the 
larger anti-tribal policy context from which they arose, and explaining 
how they represented a lost opportunity to promote tribal sovereignty 
by separating tribal and state authority in terms of both person 
(citizenry) and place (territory).  Part III will consider the foundations 
of the four previously mentioned concepts of American political 
thought and law.  Part IV will evaluate the implications of various 
types of participation by tribes, tribal citizens, and reservation citizens 
in non-tribal political processes.  Part IV will also point to evidence 
suggesting that the type of piecemeal destruction of subordinate 
sovereigns predicted by opponents of the 1789 Constitution is 
happening to tribes today in the manner and at the pace predicted by 
those opponents.  Part IV will close by suggesting some alternative 
courses of action for tribes should they chose to politically incorpo-
rate with states or separate from them. 
II. KICKING THE TIRES ON THE WELCOME WAGON: 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND STATUS OF TRIBAL VOTING AND 
PARTICIPATION 
Making an informed decision about whether or not to participate 
in non-tribal politics requires perspective on each alternative.  This 
makes a brief review of the history of and benefits gained from 
participation in non-tribal politics by tribes and tribal citizens.  This 
review will demonstrate the extent of tribal involvement in non-tribal 
politics, a factor relevant to the later analysis.  Additionally, this review 
will provide the basis for determining appropriate remedial action 
should a tribe choose to avoid the consequences of such participation. 
A. Federal and State Citizenship: Becoming Part of the American Body 
Politic 
The Federal Constitution did not specifically define who was and 
was not a citizen at first.31  Arguably it made oblique reference to some 
 
 31. William Ty Mayton, Birthright Citizenship and the Civic Minimum, 22 GEO. 
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standard for citizenship when it described the qualifications for 
various offices,32 and implied that citizenship was related to appor-
tionment and taxation.33  Whatever it did to define citizenship, it was 
at least equally clear that Indians who maintained societal and 
political ties with their tribes, i.e. those “not taxed,” were not citizens.34 
The Fourteenth Amendment introduced a broad, specific defini-
tion of citizenship, designed to eliminate racial distinctions with 
regard to citizenship.35  However, to the surprise of many non-Indians 
today, “tribal” Indians, i.e. those “not taxed,” did not fall within this 
exception because the basis for excluding “tribal” Indians was not 
racial; it was political.  In Elk v. Wilkins, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that native people born into their respective tribes did not qualify as 
citizens simply by “abandon[ing their] tribal relations,”36 and went 
into great detail with regard to how separate tribes and their citizens 
were from states and state citizens.37  Tribal citizens were not “subject 
to the jurisdiction” of the United States. They did not pay the state or 
federal taxes generally associated with citizenship, were not counted 
in apportioning representation, generally were not subject to non-
tribal law, and had only been naturalized previously by specific treaties 
or legislative acts.38  Consequently, tribal citizens could only become 
federal and state citizens with the express consent of the United States 
via established naturalization laws and processes,39 just like the vast 
majority of other foreign nationals.  Elk’s holding gave strong support 
to tribal sovereignty by equating tribes with foreign governments, thus 
 
IMMIGR. L.J. 221, 228–29 (2008). 
 32. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2 (Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 3 
(Senators); U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 5 (President). 
 33. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3. 
 34. See Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 403–04 (1856), superseded by statute, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
[Indian tribes] formed no part of the colonial communities, and never 
amalgamated with them in social connections or in government.  [T]hey 
were . . . a free and independent people, associated together in nations or 
tribes, and governed by their own laws. . . .  These Indian Governments were 
regarded and treated as foreign Governments, as much so as if an ocean 
had separated the red man from the white . . . . 
Id. at 403-04 (alteration in original). 
 35. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The Fourteenth Amendment sought to 
include all former slaves in an effort to combat slavery and its vestiges: “All persons 
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States . . . .” 
 36. 112 U.S. 94, 106 (1884) (alteration in original). 
 37. See id. at 99–109. 
 38. See id. at 102–07. 
 39. See id. at 109. 
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reaffirming Americans’ historic understanding that tribal peoples 
were neither federal nor state citizens.  They were politically separate 
in terms of both government and territory.40 
The United States naturalized many tribal citizens via treaties and 
legislation prior to 1924.41  By 1924 only about a third of all tribal 
people were not already U.S. citizens.42  The Citizenship Act of 1924 
unilaterally imposed U.S. citizenship on all remaining tribal citizens,43 
in spite of the fact that Americans, from the time of the Revolution, 
have espoused the idea that legitimate government requires the 
consent of the governed.44  Some tribes and individual Indians actively 
opposed the Act; these dissenters were nonetheless subject to the 
draft and federal taxes.45  Opposition to dual federal-tribal citizenship 
 
 40. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay) (discussing hostilities between 
Indian inhabitants and States), NO. 25 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the 
separateness of Indian nations), NO. 42 (James Madison) (concerning dangers from 
foreign force and influence); see also Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. III, ch. VIII, 1 
Stat. 50, 52 (1789); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5. Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 
543 (1823); Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 136 (2002) (citing VI REG. DEB.,CONGRESS, 1056, 1059 (1830)). 
 41. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1447 (providing for extension of 
citizenship to the Indians in the Indian Territory); Act of Mar. 3, 1921, 41 Stat. 1249, 
1249–50 (granting citizenship to members of the Osage Tribe); Act of Mar. 3, 1843, 5 
Stat. 647 (naturalizing the Stockbridge tribe of Indians); Act of Nov. 6, 1919, 41 Stat. 
350 (granting U.S. citizenship to Indians who served in the U.S. military during 
World War I); Act of Aug. 9, 1888, 25 Stat. L. 392 (granting U.S. citizenship to Indian 
women who married U.S. citizens); Treaty with the Cherokee art. 8, July 8, 1817, 7 
Stat. 1256; Treaty with the Cherokee, art. 2, Feb. 27, 1819, 7 Stat. 195, 196; Treaty with 
the Choctaw art. 14, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333, 335; Treaty with the Ottawa art. 4, 
June 24, 1862, 12 Stat. 1237, 1238; Treaty with the Seneca, Mixed Seneca, Shawnee, 
Quapaw, etc. art. 13, 17, 28, Feb. 23, 1867, 15 Stat. L. 513. 
 42. McCOOL, supra note 12, at 7–8; LYMAN TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 110 
(1973); WILCOMB WASHBURN, RED MAN’S LAND/WHITE MAN’S LAW 164 (Univ. Okla. 
Press, 2d ed. 1995); Gary C. Stein, The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 47 N.M. HIST. 
REV. 257, 257 (1972). 
 43. See Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006)); Porter, The Demise, supra note 13, at 124.  The 
Nationality Act of 1940 attempted to clear up doubt created by the language of the 
Act of 1924 as to the status of Indians born after the effective date of the prior Act.  
See Ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137, 1138 (1940) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2000)). 
 44. See infra Part III.A and accompanying text. 
 45. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956) (holding that Indians are 
subject to federal taxation “in the ordinary affairs of life”); Choteau v. Burnet, 283 
U.S. 691, 696 (1931) (holding that federal income taxes apply to Indians absent a 
treaty or statutory tax exemption); Totus v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 7, 12 (E. D. 
Wash. 1941) (holding Tribal Indians to be subject to the Selective Training and 
Service Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–303 (repealed 1956)); AMERICAN INDIANS AND 
U.S. POLITICS, supra note 2; COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 676-84 (Nell 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss2/4
12  Oeser.docx 1/20/2010  9:32 PM 
2010] TRIBAL CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 805 
continues today.46  Some dispute the constitutionality of the act.47 
Outside the reservation context, people who gain U.S. citizenship 
simultaneously become citizens of the states in which they reside.48  
Federal and state case law assumes that reservations are part of the 
states in which they exist and that therefore the same rule applies for 
reservation residents,49 although reason to doubt that conclusion 
exists.50 
 
Jessup Newton et al. eds. 2005) [hereinafter COHEN] (§ 8.02 (2)(b) “Federal Taxes: 
Federal Taxation of Tribes and Indians: Income, Estate, and Gift Taxation of 
Indians). 
 46. See  Chief Irving Powless, Jr., Speech to the University of Buffalo Law School 
(Mar. 21, 1998), reprinted in The Haudenosaunee, Yesterday and Today, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 
1081, 1083 (1998):  
[The Iroquois Confederacy] have never accepted this law.  We do not 
consider ourselves as citizens of the United States.  This law is a violation of 
the treaties that we signed that prove that we are sovereign.  Because we are 
a sovereign people, the United States cannot make us citizens of their 
nation against our will. . . . I have never voted in any election of the United 
States, and I do not intend to vote in any coming elections.  Most of our 
people have never voted in your elections. 
(alteration in original). See also Porter, The Demise, supra note 13, at 126–28, 159–60. 
 47. See Clinton, supra note 40, at 246–52; Kenneth W. Johnson, Sovereignty, 
Citizenship And the Indian, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 973, 992 (1973); Porter, The Demise, supra 
note 13, at 135–39. 
 48. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside.”) (emphasis added). 
 49. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361–62 (2001); Org. Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 
369 U.S. 60, 72 (1962); Utah & N. Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 32–33 (1885); 
Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 458, 458 (Ariz. 1948); Acosta v. San Diego County, 126 
Cal. App. 2d 455, 463, 467; (1954); Montoya v. Bolack, 372 P.2d 387, 393–94 (N.M. 
1962). 
 50. For instance, the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement that 
reservations constitute part of the surrounding state rests on strikingly flawed 
precedent.  See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361–62.  The Hicks Court ultimately based its 
assertion on a Department of Interior (“DOI”) publication, Org. Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 
and Utah & N. Ry. Co. v. Fisher.  Id.  However, the DOI publication and Kake both rely 
on Utah & N. Ry. Co.  Org. Vill. of Kake, 369 U.S. at 72; U.S. Dept. of Interior, FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW 510 n.1 (1958).  Utah & N. Ry. Co. involved state taxation of a railroad 
line situated on a tract of land through an Idaho reservation.  116 U.S. at 28-29.  The 
opinion seems to weave between three alternative arguments to find a way to validate 
the tax.  Id. at 31–33.  First, the Court ignores treaty language setting aside the 
reservation for the tribe’s “absolute and undisturbed use,” excluding all but 
“authorized” government agents, and requiring the consent of a majority of the adult 
males to cede further lands.  Id. at 30.  The Court brushes the treaty aside because 
prohibiting the tax was not “necessary” for the tribe to “enjoy the full benefit of the 
stipulations for their protection.”  Id. at 31–32.  This reasoning is facially inconsistent 
with “absolute and undisturbed use” and seems to condescendingly say the tribe will 
just not know the difference.  Next, the Court argues that the tribe ceded the tract 
where the rail line sat, thus subjecting it to state jurisdiction.  Id. at 31–33.  Assuming 
13
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B. Crashing Through Initial Roadblocks to Participation 
Attaining federal and state citizenship gave tribal citizens the 
right to vote in federal and state elections, although the vast majority 
did not do so at first, mainly for two reasons.  Many did not vote 
because anti-tribal interests went to great lengths to exclude tribal 
people from voting, often using tactics similar to those used to 
disenfranchise African Americans.51  At the same time, some tribal 
people felt that tribal citizenship, federal citizenship, and state 
citizenship were mutually exclusive.52  Both sides acknowledged vast 
cultural differences and generally lived in separate communities.  The 
states had always been adversaries of the tribes.53  Consequently, to 
vote in non-tribal elections would be meddling in the affairs of others, 
or worse, collaborating with the enemy. 
Once Indians became citizens, non-tribal opponents of tribal 
voting rights in state elections commonly used four legal arguments to 
keep tribal people from voting: 
(1) Indians were under federal guardianship, or were federal 
“wards,” and therefore not independent and competent [to 
 
the tribe ceded the land, the case ceases to stand for a reservation being part of the 
state.  Last, the Court asserts that the building of the rail line inside the reservation 
alone somehow gave the state the right to tax it.  Id. at 32–33.  This again conflicts 
with the treaty language, and with common understandings of territorial jurisdiction.  
No one thought Idaho suddenly gained the right to tax Utah or Montana lands just 
because the Utah & Northern Railway Co. ran its tracks there. 
 51. See MCCOOL, supra note 12, at 10–19; Wolfley, supra note 12, at 181–92 
(describing various justifications and tactics used by the states to deny Indians the 
right to vote); see generally United States Department of Justice, Introduction to 
Federal Voting Rights Laws, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/intro/intro_a.htm 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (describing tactics used to disenfranchise African 
Americans).  
 52. See supra note 13, and accompanying text; Doug George-Kanentiio, Why 
Iroquois will not Vote, NEWS FROM INDIAN COUNTRY, Nov. 15, 1996, at 14A (“According 
to Iroquois law, [Iroquois citizens] are expressly prohibited from participating in the 
political process of an alien nation.”); Laurence M. Hauptman, Congress, Plenary Power, 
and the American Indian, 1870 to 1992, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE 317, 326 
(1992) (quoting Tuscarora Chief Clinton Rickard) (“The Citizenship Act did pass in 
1924 despite our strong opposition.  By its provisions all Indians were automatically 
made United States citizens whether they wanted to be so or not.  This was a violation 
of our sovereignty.  Our citizenship was in our own nations.  We had a great 
attachment to our style of government.  We wished to remain treaty Indians and 
reserve our ancient rights.  There was no great rush among my people to go out and 
vote in the white man’s elections.  Anyone who did so was denied the privilege of becoming a 
chief or a clan mother in our nation.”) (emphasis added)). 
 53. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“Because of the 
local ill feeling, the people of the states where [Indian tribes] are found are often 
their deadliest enemies.”).  
14
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vote]; 
(2) Indians living on reservation lands were residents of their 
reservation and not of the state . . . [and therefore failed to 
meet residency requirements]; 
(3) Indians [living on reservations were not subject to state law,] 
did not pay state taxes and, therefore, should not be able to 
affect revenue decisions; and 
(4) Indians were not “civilized,” and their continued participa-
tion in their [t]ribal communities precluded participation in 
other elections.54 
Proponents of tribal voting successfully challenged these restric-
tions in a series of state court cases,55 clearing the first major hurdle 
toward increased tribal participation in non-tribal political processes 
at the local, state, and national levels.  Later, tribes also fought 
successfully to place precincts on reservation lands, have translators 
available at polling places, and prevent gerrymandering to marginal-
ize tribal populations.56  Recognizing that tribal participation in tribal 
elections was consistently higher than tribal participation in non-tribal 
elections,57 some tribes moved their election dates to coincide with 
 
 54. Native Voters could Affect 2004 Elections, DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITTEE, Oct. 7, 
2004, http://democrats.senate.gov/dpc/dpc-new.cfm?doc_name=sr-108-2-283 (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2009); see also COHEN, supra note 45, at 172 (describing the definition 
of Indians as “wards”); MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 3–19; Willard Hughes 
Rollings, Pursuing Equal Justice in the West: Citizenship and Suffrage: The Native American 
Struggle for Civil Rights in the American West, 1830–1965, 5 NEV. L.J. 126, 135–39 (2004) 
(discussing states’ arguments against Indians’ right to vote: Indians could not be 
civilized enough, Indians lived on Indian reservations and therefore did not pay state 
taxes, Indians were wards of the government and therefore not competent enough to 
vote, and Indians were not residents of the state). 
 55. See, e.g., Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456 (Ariz. 1948) (holding that Indians 
are not “under guardianship” as contemplated in Arizona Constitution and statutes, 
and therefore cannot be excluded from voting); Acosta v. San Diego, 272 P.2d 92 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (rejecting the argument that a reservation Indian was not a 
state resident and ordering the County to provide welfare benefits to plaintiff); 
Montoya v. Bolack, 372 P.2d 387 (N.M. 1962) (holding parts of the Navajo Reserva-
tion within the exterior boundaries of New Mexico were politically part of the state, 
and therefore, reservation residents were state residents for voting purposes); Swift v. 
Leach, 178 N.W. 437 (N.D. 1920) (holding trust-patent Indians who had become 
civilized and severed their tribal relations were qualified to vote); see also MCCOOL ET 
AL., supra note 12, at 48–67, 98–105, 119–129, 143–153. 
 56. MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 69, 72–86; Jackson, supra note 12, at 269–
81; Rollings, supra note 54, at 139–40; Wolfley, supra note 12, at 195–201 (discussing 
gerrymandering of Indians’ votes and denial of polling places in outlying Indian 
communities as well as the Voting Rights Act which requires language assistance at 
the polls).  
 57. See generally John M. Glionna, Finding a Voice in Politics, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 
15
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non-tribal elections. 
C. The Rise of Tribal Influence in Non-Tribal Politics 
Three developments in the last seventy-five years stand out as the 
most influential in the area of tribal participation in non-tribal 
politics: (1) the creation of pan-tribal organizations focused on 
promoting comprehensive political action, including voter engage-
ment; (2) the rise of tribal gaming enterprises; and (3) more recently, 
the position of tribal populations as “swing votes” in “battleground” 
states.  Together, these developments have led to an unprecedented 
level of tribal political power in non-tribal politics. 
The National Congress of American Indians came into existence 
in 1944 with the goals of coordinating tribal opposition to federal 
termination policies, securing native voting rights, and pressing for a 
commission to hear native land claims.58  NCAI’s strategy included 
educating the public and elected officials about tribal issues, lobbying, 
litigating voting rights cases, monitoring elections, and encouraging 
tribal citizen voting—essentially comprehensive political participation 
in non-tribal politics.59  When termination policy was abandoned, 
NCAI continued its effort to support tribal government and individual 
rights.  In recent years, NCAI’s efforts to encourage tribal voting have 
been directed through its Native Vote Initiative60 and appear to have 
experienced steady success.61 
Another younger organization has followed in NCAI’s footsteps, 
but with a more focused mission.  The Indigenous Democratic 
 
2004, at A-1; Sarah Kershaw & Eli Sanders, The 2004 Campaign: Voting Blocs; Politicians 
Go Courting on Indian Reservations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at A1 (discussing the 
increased influence of Indians’ votes). 
 58. See National Congress of American Indians, History, 
http://www.ncai.org/History.14.0.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (discussing the 
NCAI’s founding in 1944 in order to respond to termination and assimilation policies 
forced upon tribal governments); see also COWGER, supra note 20, at 3, 9–10, 44, 64–
65, 151–53.  
 59. COWGER, supra note 20, at 9–10, 44, 64–65, 151–54. 
 60. See generally National Congress of American Indian, Policy Issues, 
http://www.ncai.org/Policy-Issues.6.0.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (providing a 
list of policy matters addressed by the NCAI); Native Vote, http://nativevote.org/
index.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (providing information on the National 
Congress of American Indians’ 2008 Native Vote Campaign); see also MCCOOL ET AL., 
supra note 12, at 177–79. 
 61. See Jodi Rave, While Indians were Expected to go to the Polls..., BISMARCK TRIB., 
Dec. 3, 2008, at B1 (stating that preliminary numbers collected by NCAI suggest 
strong general trend of increasing tribal voting). 
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Network began in early 2005 and focuses on getting tribal candidates 
elected to non-tribal positions, i.e. “local, state, and national” 
positions.  The INDN pursues its mission through recruiting potential 
candidates, training them how to campaign, fundraising for them, 
advising them during their campaigns, and encouraging voter turnout 
on their behalf.62 
The seeds of influence sown by the NCAI and INDN took root in 
the fertile earth provided by tribal gaming enterprises.  Gaming 
enterprises gave successful tribes the resources to fund candidates, 
hire lobbyists, purchase issue-based advertising in prime-time slots, 
and make donations that gave them access on both sides of the aisle.63  
This trend has continued and accelerated.  A recent study conducted 
by the Associated Press in 2003 showed that tribes contributed about 
$7 million to federal candidates, political action committees, and 
national parties in the 2001–2002 election cycle.64  According to the 
Center for Responsive Politics, tribes donated more than $10 million 
to federal candidates alone in the 2007–2008 election cycle.65  As 
tribal gaming has grown, it has developed its own independent 
economic force in some places; employing so many non-Indians, it 
has become difficult to oppose without collateral economic damage to 
tribal and non-tribal citizens alike.66  The federal government has 
effectively made further tribal engagement in state political processes 
a high priority for tribes with the passage of the Indian Gaming 
 
 62. See Indigenous Democratic Network, Our Mission, http://indnslist.org/
OurMission (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (describing the INDN’s four-pronged strategy 
to elect Democratic Indians and involve Indians in the political process); Indigenous 
Democratic Network List, Helping Indians Run, http://indnslist.org/HelpIndiansRun 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (describing INDN’s assistance which includes recruitment, 
training, funding, and providing assistance throughout the campaign). 
 63. See MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 185–87; Dao, supra note 16 (discussing 
the political power created by Indian’s gambling profits); Wilkins, supra note 13, at 
732–33; (discussing the use of Indian gaming finances to make significant funding 
contributions to American political campaigns).  
 64. See Tribes can give Candidates more Cash American Indian Tribes are Exempt from 
the Overall Donor Limit in Federal Campaign Law, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 18, 2003, at A1 
(describing American Indian tribes’ use of their advantage in political giving: they do 
not have to abide by the overall individual donor limit). 
 65. See Center for Responsive Politics, Indian Gaming: Long-Term Contribution 
Trends, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?cycle=2008&ind=g6550 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
 66. See, e.g., W. DALE MASON, INDIAN GAMING: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS 88, 147, 160 (2000) (referring to economic benefits such as job creation 
produced by casino operations as well as the conflict between Indian gaming interests 
and non-Indian gaming interests). 
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Regulatory Act and its compacting requirement.67 
With the seeds sown and the ground fertile, changes in the politi-
cal climate have provided ripe conditions for those seeds to sprout.  
Margins of victory between the two major parties appeared to narrow 
from the 2000 election until the 2008 election.68  Given that tribal 
populations generally strongly favor Democrats as a group,69 they can 
tip elections, and while it might be hard to prove,70 they probably 
have.  In Native Vote: American Indians, the Voting Rights Act, and the 
Right to Vote, the authors characterize this new group of participating 
native peoples as a “swing-vote electorate,”71 and they are not alone.72  
Whatever the reality is, major parties have paid more attention to 
tribal voting blocks in recent years than ever before based on that 
 
 67. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2008); Kathryn R.L. Rand, Caught In 
The Middle: How State Politics, State Law, and State Courts Constrain Tribal Influence over 
Indian Gaming, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 971, 972, 1000 (2007) (discussing the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act and its affect on the states); see, e.g., MASON, supra note 66, at 59–69, 
146–75 (examining legislative intent to set up a system in which state and Indian 
tribes communicate and the Act’s application in New Mexico state court).  
 68. See generally MCCOOLET AL., supra note 12, at 176–77 (“Efforts to mobilize 
Indian voters have been greatest in a few western swing states, where such voters can 
make the difference between defeat or victory in certain races.”); Glionna, supra note 
57; Kershaw & Sanders, supra note 57 (“In the last few years, political races from 
Congress to county sheriff have begun to hinge on the Indian vote, particularly in 
places like South Dakota, where the Indian population is 8 percent [sic].  Republi-
cans and Democrats alike, including the presidential candidates, are courting Indians 
as never before . . . .”). 
 69. Open Secrets, Indian Gaming: Long-Term Contribution Trends, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?cycle=2008&ind=g6550 (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
 70. It is impossible to point to a particular vote that won a particular race, even 
when the margin of victory is narrow. 
 71. MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 176. 
 72. See, e.g., Anne T. Denogean, 60 Years Ago in Arizona, Indians Won Right to Vote, 
TUCSON CITIZEN, July 24, 2008 (“American Indian clout in Arizona sometimes 
manifests as the swing vote.  An exceptional Indian turnout in 2002 helped put Janet 
Napolitano into office as governor in a race decided by 11,819 votes.”); Denis 
Staunton, Presidential Hopefuls on The Trail of Native American Vote, IRISH TIMES, May 31, 
2008, at 9; (“Indians form 10 per cent of the population of New Mexico, a key swing 
state . . . and they could make a difference to tight races in Colorado and Nevada—
and even California . . . .”); The Race is on for Congressional District 1: Norris; Navajos are 
‘Sleeping Giant’, NAVAJO TIMES, Feb. 28, 2002, at A1; U.S. FEDERAL NEWS, Native 
Americans Could Decide Race In Key States, U.S. FED. NEWS, Nov. 3, 2008, available at 2008 
WLNR 21919854 (“Congressional District 1 is in northern Arizona . . . the district has 
a 25 percent population of Native Americans . . . .  [I]t’s a swing district.”); Jodi Rave, 
The National Congress of American Indians Leading National “Election Protection” Measure, 
BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 1, 2008, at B1 (“[T]he Native vote in some districts is as high as 
20 percent, allowing for enough voters to determine the final results of an election.”). 
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perception.73 
D. Tribes’ Political Harvest 
Although it is difficult to establish clear causation when it comes 
to elections and politics, the election of tribal citizens to non-tribal 
political office represents strong evidence of the level of tribal 
influence.  Today, at least thirty tribal citizens have been elected to 
state legislatures in the continental states,74 many of whom represent 
districts that overlap with reservations. 
The causal connection between tribal participation and non-
tribal election results stretches a bit thinner when the candidates in 
question are non-tribal and the district in question is not made up 
primarily of tribal voters.  Nonetheless, many attribute the outcome of 
some races featuring those candidates and districts to tribal interests.  
For instance, tribal citizens make up only about two percent of 
Washington State’s population; however, tribal votes and tribal 
gaming revenues have been credited with providing important 
financial support that resulted in the defeat of U.S. Senator Slade 
Gordon in 2000, the 129-vote victory of Governor Christine Gregoire 
in 2004, and the 2006 re-election of U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell.75  In 
the 2002 South Dakota U.S. Senate race, Tim Johnson trailed 
Republican challenger John Thune most of the night, but took the 
lead when the last two precincts were counted—precincts that 
 
 73. Glionna, supra note 57; Daniel Lathrop, Native Americans Launch D.C. 
Lobbying Campaign, THE HILL, July 15, 1998, at 9 (“The Democratic National 
Committee has aggressively targeted American Indians in recent years and continues 
to do so.  The DNC has brought tribal leaders to Washington for political training, 
formed an advisory committee on American Indian concerns and adopted an official 
plank supporting tribal sovereignty.”); Rockin’ Out the Native Vote—’Rez Rock the Vote’ 
Airs on PBS, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, October 6, 2004 (“[B]oth Democrats and 
Republicans are vying for the Native vote.  President Bush met with tribal leaders and 
veterans during the opening of the National Museum of the American Indian and 
reaffirmed tribal sovereignty.  The Democratic National Committee in Washington, 
D.C. is now preparing American Indian field directors and hosting the first ever 
Native American Field Training Program. . . . New Native American Field Directors 
are being deployed to battleground states with significant Native American 
populations including Arizona, New Mexico, Washington, Colorado, Nevada, 
Oregon, Michigan, Wisconsin, Florida and Minnesota.”). 
 74. This figure excludes representatives from Alaska and Hawaii.  Adding these 
states, the total rises to 35.  See supra note 22. 
 75. Amy Argetsinger, Judge Upholds Win For Wash. Governor, WASH. POST, June 7, 
2005, at A04; Lynda V. Mapes, More Natives Step Into Legislature, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 9, 
2007. 
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covered most of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation.76 
E. Missing Context 
Many people, tribal and non-tribal, have celebrated the ability of 
reservation citizens to vote in state, and thereby national, elections.77  
They have rejoiced in their ability to defeat anti-tribal legislation and 
officials.  Unfortunately, this joy overshadowed the fact that the right 
of reservation citizens to vote in non-tribal elections started out as the 
capstone of a federal policy designed to destroy tribal sovereignty. 
1. The Means and Ends of the “Allotment and Assimilation” 
and “Termination” Policies 
The federal government’s “Indian” policy has, by and large, fo-
cused on “getting rid” of the “Indian problem.”78  “Indians” 
represented a “problem” for Americans primarily for four reasons.  
First, they lived on land desired by non-tribal people.79  Settlers 
wanted land for homesteads, farms, and ranches.80  Businesses wanted 
to profit from the available natural resources, including gold, or the 
right to lay train tracks through reservations.81  In the eyes of sur-
rounding non-tribal communities, tribes failed to put the land to 
good use in many instances, and therefore did not need it, or worse, 
 
 76. MICHAEL BARONE ET AL., THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1468 (2004). 
 77. Accord Arizona Natives to Celebrate Native American Right to Vote Day, REZNET, July 
11, 2008, http://www.reznetnews.org/blogs/tribalog/arizona-natives-celebrate-native-
american-right-vote-day-16590# (last visited Nov. 12, 2009); Navaho Woman Awarded for 
Contesting Prop. 200 Law, NATIVE AM. TIMES, July 25, 2008, at 2, available at 2008 WLNR 
16422348. 
 78. CALLOWAY, supra note 15, at 404. 
 79. CALLOWAY, supra note 15, at 218–43, 290–316, 372–403; Merrill E. Gates, 
Land and Law as Agents in Educating Indians, in SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
BOARD OF INDIAN COMMISSIONERS 17–19, 26–35 (1885) and reprinted in AMERICANIZING 
THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE “FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN” 1880–1900, at 47–48 
(Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973) (“The great mass of our legislation regarding Indians 
has had to do with getting land we had promised them into our possession by the 
promise of a price as low as we could fix and yet keep them from making border 
warfare upon us . . . .”). 
 80. CALLOWAY, supra note 15, at 218–43, 290–316, 372–403. 
 81. Id.; Porter, The Demise, supra note 13, at 114 (“Congress was under considera-
ble pressure from two competing interests to resolve this question in favor of ending a 
separatist approach.  The railroads and other business interests were eager to 
appropriate the remaining Indian lands to promote further Westward expansion.  
These were extremely powerful forces that were offset and tempered only by the 
intensity and commitment of the social reformers bent on ‘“helping’” the Indians 
through the perpetuation of their Indian civilization efforts.”). 
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were not worthy of it because they were guilty of the moral sin of 
sloth.82  State governments viewed these lands as “lost” tax revenues83 
and areas of “lawlessness” interrupting their otherwise lawful domi-
nion, providing a safe haven for those seeking to evade state law.84   
Second, tribes were a problem because they could resist efforts to 
take territory by force until at least the late 1800s.  Tribes did not 
always win open conflicts, but up to the turn of the nineteenth 
century they could make military conflict financially, strategically, or 
politically prohibitive.85  They could also tip the balance in conflicts 
between other sovereign forces.86  The allegiance of tribal forces, 
therefore, played a major role in American policy from the Revolution 
through the Civil War for these reasons.87   
Third, tribes were a problem because by the time they lost the 
ability to mount substantial armed resistance, sufficient numbers of 
religious or otherwise humanitarian non-tribal groups were pushing 
for “civilization” of the tribes, based on a moral obligation to honor 
governmental agreements and a sense of “noblesse oblige.”88  The 
influence of these groups made open extermination not viable 
politically, although some considered genocide a legitimate option.89   
 
 82. 18 Cong. Rec. 190 (1886) (statement of Rep. Skinner); AMERICANIZING THE 
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 79, at 47–48 (“We have held [the Indians] at arm’s 
length, cut them off from the teaching power of good example, and given them 
rations and food to hold them in habits of abject laziness.”); CALLOWAY, supra note 15, 
at 230 (stating that non-Indians rationalized taking Indian land because “Indians did 
not put the land to good use . . . and could not be allowed to deny that land to 
American farmers.”); Porter, The Demise, supra note 13, at 112–19. 
 83. See infra note 275. 
 84. Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in 
California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1405, 1409–15 (1997) (describing how 
19th and 20th century impressions of Indian Country as “lawless” related to the 
introduction and passage of Public Law 280). 
 85. CALLOWAY, supra note 15, at 162–80, 218–43, 290–316. 
 86. See generally id. (describing tribal involvement in American wars through the 
nineteenth century). 
 87. See generally id. 
 88. See id. at 404–10; Gates, supra note 79, at 46–49 (arguing that considerations 
of noblesse oblige should urge the United States to “save the Indian from himself” 
through promotion of civilization, Christianity, and citizenship); Porter, The Demise, 
supra note 13, at 114–15 (discussing the influence of the Indian Rights Association in 
promoting efforts at civilization). 
 89. MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 5 (“One approach was basically genocide, 
replete with statements that all Indians should be exterminated forthwith, or, in 
Senator Doolittle’s quaint phrase quoted earlier, ‘put . . . out of the way.’ Colonel 
George Armstrong Custer clearly demonstrated this objective when he slaughtered a 
Cheyenne village on the Washita River in 1868—the year the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was ratified.  A Nebraska newspaper at that time editorialized: ‘Exterminate the 
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Last, tribes were a problem because the material support pro-
vided to “Indians” by the federal government cost a great deal of 
money for which the people providing that support thought they 
received little or no benefit.90   
Consequently, any comprehensive solution to the “Indian prob-
lem” had to do four things: (1) siphon tribal land and resources out 
of tribal control and into non-tribal hands; (2) not rely primarily on 
the use of military force, which meant using diplomacy, law, or both; 
(3) give jurisdiction over tribal lands to state governments; and (4) 
relieve the federal government of its obligation of support and 
supervision. 
From 1871 to 1934, the federal government thought the answer 
was “allotment and assimilation.”91  The main goal of this policy was 
the “absor[ption of tribes] into the mainstream of American life,” and 
the destruction of “the ‘savagery’ of tribal autonomy.”92  Tribal 
peoples were to “participate fully in the American system” to “end the 
tribe as a separate political and cultural unit,” and to “have exactly the 
same law appl[y] to [them] as applied to whites.”93  Part and parcel of 
the assimilation end game was to confer U.S. citizenship on tribal 
citizens.94 
Congress passed three main pieces of legislation to accomplish 
this task—the 1887 General Allotment Act95 (GAA), the 1924 Indian 
Citizenship Act,96 and the 1885 Major Crimes Act.97  The GAA aimed 
to break up tribal territories.  It gave the President discretion to divide 
 
whole fraternity of redskins.’”); RENNARD STRICKLAND, THE INDIANS IN OKLAHOMA 38 
(H. Wayne Morgan et al. ed., Univ. of Okla. Press 1980) (quoting Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs Hiram Price, “[O]ne of two things must eventually take place, to wit, 
either civilization or extermination of the Indian.”). 
 90. See LORING BENSON PRIEST, UNCLE SAM’S STEPCHILDREN: THE REFORMATION OF 
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, 1865–1887, AT 107–108 (Bison Book 1975) (1942) 
(discussing Congress’s growing reluctance to provide annuities, seeing them only as 
charity as excess tribal lands were absorbed by the government). 
 91. ROBERT CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 30–36 (LexisNexis, 5th ed. 2007); cf. COHEN, supra note 45, at 75–84 
(describing the shortcomings of “Allotment and Assimilation 1871-1928”). 
 92. COHEN, supra note 45, at 77. 
 93. Id. at 77, 81. 
 94. Id. at 899 (“It became a major goal of the assimilation process to make 
Indians citizens of the United States. This was especially true with the allotment 
policy.”). 
 95. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (repealed 2000). 
 96. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1994)). 
 97. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §1153 (2006)). 
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up any reservation he thought “advantageous for agricultural or 
grazing purposes” into parcels of pre-determined size, called allot-
ments.98  Once selected, the reservation was surveyed and a census of 
tribal citizens made.  Tribal citizens then had the opportunity to select 
allotments.99  Some tribal citizens did not select allotments; a federal 
agent assigned allotments to these tribal citizens.100  If “surplus” lands 
existed after all allotments were made, the federal government could 
sell such land to settlers.101  Initially, the consent of the tribe whose 
land was to be allotted had to be obtained before any “surplus” lands 
could be sold;102 however, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lone 
Wolf v. Hitchcock undid the consent requirement.103   
Allotted lands were generally held in trust for twenty-five years, 
during which time they could not be alienated or encumbered.104  The 
idea was that during the trust period tribal members would be 
educated, Christianized, forced to adopt non-tribal culture, and 
forced to abandon “heathen” culture.105  The trust period could be cut 
short by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs if the allottee proved to 
be sufficiently “competent” to manage his or her affairs,106 although 
proof of competency usually bore more relation to rationalizing the 
transfer of land out of Indian hands than genuinely giving Indians 
control of their own affairs.107  At the end of the trust period, the 
allottee was granted a fee patent entitling the allottee to alienate the 
land and making the land subject to state criminal and civil jurisdic-
tion, including property taxation.108  Upon receiving the fee patent, 
the allottee also became a U.S. citizen.109 
The Indian Citizenship Act110 sought to break up tribal govern-
ments by compromising the foundation of all governments—their 
 
 98. See Beck v. Flournoy Live-Stock & Real-Estate Co., 65 F. 30, 33 (8th Cir. 1894) 
(internal quotations omitted) (referring to section 1 of the Act of Feb. 8, 1887). 
 99. See id. (referring to section 2 of the Act of Feb. 8, 1887). 
 100. See id. (referring to section 3 of the Act of Feb. 8, 1887).  
 101. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2006). 
 102. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388 (repealed 2000).  
 103. 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903). 
 104. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). 
 105. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J., 1, 10–12 (1995). 
 106. Burke Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 182 (amending § 6 of the General Allotment Act) 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349). 
 107. See Royster, supra note 105, at 10–12. 
 108. Burke Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 182. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)). 
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citizenry.111 Although the U.S. Supreme Court baldly stated that dual 
tribal-federal citizenship under the GAA during the trust period was 
not incompatible,112 it clearly stated that the GAA’s ultimate goal when 
all land had been allotted and all trust periods expired was to dissolve 
tribal governments, terminate the federal guardianship, and extend 
state law over the allottees.113  The 1924 Citizenship Act unilaterally 
admitted tribal citizens to U.S. citizenship regardless of whether they 
consented to being citizens.114  The act declared that it “shall not in 
any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal 
or other property.”115  However, if expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the 
statute left open the possibility that such dual citizenship might 
“impair or otherwise affect” other rights, including sovereign rights.116  
If there were no conflict with regard to dual citizenship, the language 
regarding property should not have been necessary. 
The Major Crimes Act117 undermined tribes by replacing tribal 
law, processes, and authority with non-tribal ones in a primarily 
governmental and culturally crucial area—criminal justice.118 The Act 
extended federal jurisdiction and non-tribal concepts of criminal 
justice over tribes and reservations land.  The Act authorized the 
federal enforcement of seven specific crimes committed against the 
person or property of an “Indian or other person.”119  The Act 
represented the first extension of non-tribal jurisdiction over 
exclusively tribal affairs.120  Prior statutes and agreements only 
governed offenses when non-tribal individuals or property were 
involved.121  Other programs begun by the Indian Service during this 
period also sought to destroy tribal culture and autonomy, including 
Indian Police, the Courts of Indian Offenses, and Indian Boarding 
 
 111. Id.  Many tribal citizens were granted U.S. citizenship by the GAA, earlier 
agreements, and other legislation.  See supra note 41.  “Many [of these] efforts were 
designed to make tribal memberships and United States citizenship mutually 
exclusive.” COHEN, supra note 45, at 83. 
 112. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 598 (1916). 
 113. See id. at 596–97. 
 114. See supra note 42. 
 115. Ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153). 
 118. The Act was a direct result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte 
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
 119. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat. at 385. 
 120. Royster, supra note 105, at 43–44. 
 121. Id. at 44.  
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Schools.122 
After a brief period of affirmation of tribal governments,123 the 
federal government pursued a new answer to the “Indian problem” 
from 1943 to 1962—a policy of “termination.”124  This policy period 
had goals identical to those of the allotment and assimilation 
period,125 but used a more accelerated time line and slightly different 
means.  Once again the ultimate goal was to “as rapidly as possible . . . 
make the Indians . . . subject to the same laws and entitled to the same 
privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens [and] 
to end their status as wards . . . and to grant them all of the rights and 
prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship.”126  Another goal of 
termination policy was for “all of the Indian tribes and the individual 
members . . . [to] be freed from Federal supervision and control and 
from all disabilities and limitations specially applicable to Indians” as 
soon as possible,127 “end[ing] most aspects of the historic relationships 
between the federal government and [any terminated] tribes, 
transferring responsibility for those tribes to states.”128 
Legislation pursuing the termination policy mainly took two 
forms—acts “terminating” specific tribes and acts extending state 
jurisdiction over reservations.  An act terminating a tribe would 
generally set a deadline for termination of two to five years.129  During 
that time, final rolls would be prepared and the tribal property would 
be distributed.130  Ultimately, federal education, health, welfare, and 
housing assistance ended, and state legislative and judicial jurisdiction 
was imposed, including state taxation authority.  Federal and tribal 
laws no longer applied.131 
The federal government also extended state jurisdiction over 
 
 122. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 91, at 35–36. 
 123. COHEN, supra note 45, at 84–89 (generally referred to as “Indian Reorganiza-
tion” policy period, roughly 1928-1942). 
 124. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 91, at 39–41; Cf. COHEN, supra note 45, at 89–97 
(“Termination 1943-1961”). 
 125. COHEN, supra note 45, at 90 (“[This period] turned Native American policy 
back onto itself, reflecting the practices and philosophy of the earlier era of allotment 
and assimilation.”). 
 126. H.R. CON. RES. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953); COHEN, supra note 45, 
at 94. 
 127. H.R. CON. RES. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953). 
 128. COHEN, supra note 45, at 94–95. 
 129. Id. at 95. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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reservations by means of Public Law 280.132  This law unilaterally 
transferred civil and criminal jurisdiction over almost all reservations 
within five states to the governments of those states.133  The law 
envisioned similar transfers in each of the remaining states so long as 
the voters of each state consented to assume it.  “The alleged justifica-
tion was a lawlessness that amounted to the complete breakdown of 
law and order on Indian reservations because of the inadequacy of 
tribal law enforcement and institutions.”134  In 1968, Congress 
required tribal consent to extend state jurisdiction under Public Law 
280; however, nine additional states had already assumed full or 
partial jurisdiction by that time.135 
2. Lining Up the Timeline: Federal Policy and Tribal Citizen Voting 
in Non-Tribal Elections 
Viewed in isolation, it comes as no surprise that conflicts over 
Indian voting occurred during a policy period in which Congress 
passed legislation conferring citizenship on large numbers of Indians.  
However, when placed in a broader historical context, the connection 
between these challenges and federal efforts to eliminate tribal 
sovereignty become clearer.  Numerous tribal citizens had been 
granted federal citizenship prior to the GAA.136  Despite this, few cases, 
 
 132. Pub. L. No. 83-280, Ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (section 7 repealed and 
reenacted as amended 1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 1321-1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, 1360 note); COHEN, supra note 45, at 96, 544–65. 
 133. Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin were the 
original “mandatory” states.  Pub. L. No. 83-280, Ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953).  The 
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation in Oregon and the Red Lake 
Band of Chippewa Indians Minnesota were specifically excluded from Public Law 280 
jurisdiction. COHEN, supra note 45, at 96, 544–65. 
 134. COHEN, supra note 45, at 96. 
 135. Indian Civil Rights Act, 82 Stat. 78 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C 
§§ 1321–1326 (1968)); COHEN, supra note 45, at 96–97. 
 136. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884): 
[Indians] were never deemed citizens of the United States, except under 
explicit provisions of treaty or statute to that effect, either declaring a cer-
tain tribe, or such members of it as chose to remain behind on the removal 
of the tribe westward, to be citizens, or authorizing individuals of particular 
tribes to become citizens on application to a court of the United States for 
naturalization, and satisfactory proof of fitness for civilized life; for examples 
of which see treaties in 1817 and 1835 with the Cherokees, and in 1820, 
1825, and 1830 with the Choctaws, 7 Stat. 159, 211, 236, 335, 483, 488; 
Wilson v. Wall, 6 Wall. 83; Opinion of Attorney-General Taney, 2 Opinion of 
Attorneys General 462; in 1855 with the Wyandotts, 10 St. 1159; Karrahoo v. 
Adams, 1 Dillon 344, 346; Gray v. Coffman, 3 Dillon 393; Hicks v. Butrick, 3 
Dillon 413; in 1861 and in March, 1866, with the Pottawatomies, 12 Stat. 
26
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if any, involving state or territorial voting rights for reservation citizens 
exist prior to the start of the Allotment and Assimilation Period in 
1871.  It was only when the federal government began pushing the 
extension of citizenship and state political rights to tribal citizens as 
part of its plan to eliminate tribes that these challenges began in 
earnest and, more importantly, began to succeed. 
Many states voluntarily amended their voter requirements during 
the termination period to allow Indians to vote without the need for 
litigation.137  Other states continued to resist the effort to extend state 
political rights to tribal citizens, making court challenges necessary.  
The major cases first successfully contesting the categorical exclusion 
of reservation citizens from voting were all decided during either the 
allotment and assimilation period (1871 to 1934),138 or the termina-
tion policy period (1943 to 1962).139  State ex rel. Crawford v. Norris 
(decided in 1893),140 Swift v. Leach (decided in 1920),141 Trujillo v. 
 
1192; 14 Stat. 763; in 1862 with the Ottawas, 12 Stat. 1237; and the Kick-
apoos, 13 Stat. 624; and acts of Congress of March 3, 1839, ch. 83, § 7, 
concerning the Brothertown Indians, and of March 3, 1843, ch. 101, § 7, 
August 6, 1846, ch. 88, and March 3, 1865, ch. 127, § 4, concerning the 
Stockbridge Indians, 5 Stat. 351, 647; 9 Stat. 55; 13 Stat. 562.  See also trea-
ties with the Stockbridge Indians in 1848 and 1856, 9 Stat. 955; 11 Stat. 667; 
7 Opinions of Attorneys General, 746.  
See also supra note 37. 
 137. In 1950, seven years after the federal government adopted termination as its 
policy, Idaho repealed a constitutional provision prohibiting voting by “Indians not 
taxed, who have not severed their tribal relations and adopted the habits of 
civilization.”  Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
591, 645–46 (2009) (citing PAULI MURRAY, STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR 118 
(Univ. of Ga. Press 1997).  In 1951, South Dakota rescinded its statute stating that 
Indians “maintaining tribal relations . . . cannot vote or hold office.”  Id.  Maine 
amended its constitution in 1954 to remove the “Indians not taxed” exclusion from its 
voting requirements.  TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 91.  Utah removed language from its 
statutes in 1957 declaring reservation residents were not residents of the state for 
purposes of voting.  MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 96–97.  In 1960, two years before 
the federal government abandoned termination as a policy, Minnesota amended its 
constitution to remove a provision restricting Indian voting to “[p]ersons of mixed 
white and Indian blood who have adopted the customs and habits of civilization and 
[p]ersons of Indian blood . . . who have adopted the language, customs and habits of 
civilization, after an examination before any district court of the State.”  Berger, supra, 
(citing MURRAY, supra). 
 138. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 91. 
 139. Id. 
 140. 55 N.W. 1086 (Neb. 1893) (holding that Indians who had received 
allotments under the GAA were qualified to vote and votes cast in precincts located 
on Indian reservations were valid). 
 141. 178 N.W. 437 (N.D. 1920) (holding that sufficient evidence had been 
presented to support the finding that trust patent Indians were civilized and had 
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Garley (decided in 1948),142 Harrison v. Laveen (decided in 1948),143 
Acosta v. San Diego County (decided in 1954),144 and Montoya v. Bolack 
(decided in 1962)145 represent the vanguard of these cases.  
F.  Misplaced Battles and Missed Opportunities 
Many people justifiably excoriate the defendants in the cases just 
mentioned as racists.  Evidence of bigotry appears at almost every 
turn.  Sadly, the motivations behind the defendants’ arguments have 
overshadowed the most interesting and potentially beneficial part of 
these cases—the arguments themselves.  Regardless of motivation, 
states defending the exclusion of reservation residents from voting in 
state elections made many arguments tribes can only dream about 
states making today, specifically, that reservations were, politically and 
territorially, entirely separate from the state. 
Tribes146 and tribal citizens reacted strangely to this new state po-
 
severed their tribal relations so that they met state voter qualifications). 
 142. MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 11–13. A New Mexico trial court decided 
Trujillo in 1948.  In Trujillo, a World War II veteran returned from the war to live on 
his reservation and tried to register to vote in a state election.  Id. at 13.   He was told 
he could not register because he was not a state resident and was an “Indian not 
taxed.”  Id.  A three-judge panel held for Mr. Trujillo.  Id.  The court first concluded 
that he was a state resident.  The court went on to write:  
We are unable to escape the conclusion that, under the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments, that constitutes a discrimination on the ground of 
race. Any other citizen, regardless of race, in the State of New Mexico who 
has not paid one cent of tax of any kind or character, if he possesses the 
other qualification, may vote.  
Id.  The decision went unappealed and unreported, but resulted in a permanent 
injunction against enforcing the “Indians not taxed” provision of the New Mexico 
Constitution.  Id.  The New Mexico Supreme Court later referenced Trujillo in the 
process of deciding Montoya v. Bolack, holding that Indians living on the Navaho 
Reservation met state residency requirements because the reservation was part of the 
state.  Montoya v. Bolack, 372 P.2d 387, 390 (N.M. 1962). 
 143. 196 P.2d 456 (Ariz. 1948) (stating that the Indians’ relationship with the 
federal government “resembles” that of a ward to its guardian but Indians are not 
“under guardianship” as contemplated in Arizona Constitution and statutes). 
 144. 272 P.2d 92 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (holding that a residence on 
reservation constitutes residence in the state entitling plaintiff to welfare benefits). 
 145. 372 P.2d 387 (N.M. 1962) (holding that those parts of the Navajo Reserva-
tion within the exterior boundaries of New Mexico were politically part of the state, 
and therefore, reservation residents were state residents for voting purposes). 
 146. Tribes did not usually appear in these cases, but even when they did not, in 
most instances pan-tribal political action groups, like NCAI, or other legitimately or 
ostensibly pro-Indian organizations, supported and guided the litigation.  Even in the 
absence of such pan-tribal involvement, it is unlikely the tribe was unaware of the 
case. 
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sition.  They had historically sought to secure guarantees of autono-
my, almost without exception by treaty, even though the federal 
government broke those promises with the exact same frequency.  
They had filed law suits opposing exertions of state authority on 
reservations, pursuing tribal rights all the way to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, although they generally had lost ground.  Then, when states 
started making arguments in the Indian voting cases congruent with 
tribes’ historic position, tribes and their citizens suddenly switched sides and 
opposed those arguments in order to secure voting rights for reservation 
citizens. 
Porter v. Hall,147 the Arizona case overruled by Harrison v. Laveen, 
presents a prime example of states making arguments congruent with 
tribal sovereignty.  In Porter, two Pima tribal citizens sought a writ of 
mandamus requiring the county recorder to register them to vote. 
The Arizona Attorney General’s Office represented the recorder.148  
Admitting that the recorder refused to register the plaintiffs, the state 
argued 
[t]hat the plaintiffs . . . are members of the Pima Tribe of 
Indians, . . . residents of the Gila River Indian Reservation 
and have never had . . . any residence other than upon . . . 
the reservation, and have no property except on said reser-
vation, and that the plaintiffs . . . were . . . and are now sub-
ject to all the rules and regulations and laws of the United 
States enacted for the control and regulation of Indian res-
ervations and Indian tribes. . . . That said . . . reservation, the 
plaintiffs herein, and their property are . . . exclusively subject to 
and under the jurisdiction of the laws and courts of the United 
States and the tribal customs of said Pima Tribe, and are not subject 
to the laws or within the jurisdiction of the state of Arizona.  That 
said . . . reservation while within the geographical bounda-
ries of . . . Arizona is not subject to the laws of the state of Arizona, 
and is, therefore, not a part of the state of Arizona, either politically 
or governmentally, . . . and that, therefore, plaintiffs are not 
residents of the state of Arizona within the meaning of . . . 
the Constitution of the State of Arizona.149  
Arizona’s presentation of this as its official position in a case argued 
before its supreme court is nothing short of astounding.  Arizona 
could have argued it had authority over the reservation, despite 
 
 147. 271 P. 411, 412 (Ariz. 1928), overruled by Harrison, 196 P.2d at 457. 
 148. 271 P. at 412. 
 149. Id. at 412–13 (emphasis added). 
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language in its Enabling Act, but it chose not to.150  This choice stands 
in stark contrast to the history of Indian law generally, which, among 
other things, chronicles efforts by states to assume jurisdictional 
control over tribal lands and subjugate tribal peoples.151  A ruling in 
the state’s favor at the supreme court level adopting the state’s 
reasoning could have had substantial ripple effects.  Had the Arizona 
Supreme Court agreed that the state had no claim to govern reserva-
tion lands, and that the reservation did not form part of the state, the 
resulting decision would have bound the state to that position.  Given 
that a state’s jurisdiction cannot extend beyond its own territory, such 
a holding would have seriously called into question, if not outright 
overruled, all present and future exertions of state authority within 
reservation borders—from regulation of hunting and fishing, to 
zoning, to taxation. 
The plaintiffs’ response was equally astonishing, although in a 
disturbing way.  According to the court, the plaintiffs essentially 
denied their tribe had any sovereign character whatsoever, and was 
simply a group of people with a common race: 
 Plaintiffs replied, admitting their race and residence as al-
leged in the answer, and that they were under the control of 
the laws and rules of the United States governing Indian 
reservations, but denying that they were subject to any Indian tri-
bal customs, or that the reservation was not subject to the laws of 
Arizona, and alleging that the United States exercises no 
jurisdiction or control over them or their property, except 
over certain property held in trust for them.152  
 Interestingly, the Porter court found a way not to agree with either 
side completely.  It held that reservations were politically part of the 
state, but that Indians were not competent to be voters because they 
were “under guardianship,” equating Indians with people “non compos 
 
 150. Arizona’s Enabling Act disclaimed “all right” to lands “held by . . . Indian 
tribes.”  Id. at 414.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court had essentially ruled that such 
disclaimers did not operate to exclude state authority in Draper v. United States, 164 
U.S. 240 (1896) (citing United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881)).  The Porter 
opinion ultimately relied on this reasoning.  Porter, 271 P. at 414–16. 
 151. The focus of “Indian law” from a non-tribal prospective has always been to 
transfer tribal lands into non-tribal hands.  CALLOWAY, supra note 15, at 236 (“Alexis 
de Tocqueville, a French visitor to the United States, observed the removal process 
and concluded that, whereas the Spaniards had earned a reputation for brutality in 
their dispossession of the Indians, the Americans had attained the same objective 
under the pretense of legality and philanthropy.”).  See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
 152. Porter, 271 P. at 413 (emphasis added). 
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mentis.”  In the process of this rather offensive ruling, the court did 
draw in part on basic American civics: 
The theory on which democracy is founded is that every 
person who is bound to obey the laws should participate in 
making them, and, conversely, that every one who partici-
pates in making the laws should be subject to their jurisdic-
tion. . . . It is almost unheared [sic] of in a democracy that 
those who make the laws need not obey them.153  
The Porter court went on, quoting a similar Minnesota case, Opsahl v. 
Johnson.154  The contestant in Opsahl challenged the results of a state 
election on the basis that citizen-residents of the Red Lake Reserva-
tion had inappropriately voted in the election.  Finding for the 
contestant, the Porter court wrote: 
[T]here are . . . cogent reasons urged by contestant against 
holding mixed bloods living on Indian reservations entitled 
to vote.  The exercise of the elective franchise is participa-
tion in government and in the making of the laws to which 
all the inhabitants of a nation, state, or municipality must 
yield obedience.  It cannot for a moment be considered that 
the framers of the Constitution intended to grant the right 
of suffrage to persons who were under no obligation to obey 
the laws enacted as a result of such grant.  Or, in other 
words, that those who do not come within the operation of 
the laws of the state, nevertheless shall have the power to 
make and impose laws upon others.  The idea is repugnant 
to our form of government.  No one should participate in 
the making of laws which he need not obey.155 
The Opsahl court also analogized Indian voting to the Colonial 
troubles with Britain, describing it as “another phase of the wrong 
done in the taxation of the Colonies.”156  The Opsahl court ultimately 
concluded:  
[T]ribal Indians have not adopted the customs and habits of 
civilization, within the purview of the elective franchise pro-
visions of our Constitution, until they have adopted that 
custom and habit which all other inhabitants must needs 
adopt when they come into the state, namely that of yielding 
obedience and submission to its laws.157 
 
 153. Id. at 416. 
 154. Id. (citing Opsahl v. Johnson, 138 Minn. 42, 48, 163 N.W. 988, 990 (1917)). 
 155. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 156. Opsahl, 138 Minn. at 50, 163 N.W. at 991. 
 157. Id. 
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Non-tribal governments disclaimed jurisdiction over tribal terri-
tory in other cases as well, and based those disclaimers in part on 
fundamental American democratic theory.158  Some courts explicitly 
rejected the proposition that Indians were categorically unable to 
vote, but conditioned the ability to vote on a change in citizenship, 
implicitly recognizing tribes as discrete, separate governments159 in the 
same manner as Elk v. Wilkins.  The Opsahl court essentially inter-
preted language associated with assimilation—“adopt[] the customs 
and habits of civilization”160—to mean Indians had to be similarly 
situated to non-Indian state citizens in relation to the body politic 
before they participated in the body politic with non-Indian citi-
zens—a fundamental fairness argument.161  Opsahl was not the only 
case to do this.162  
 
 158. See, e.g., Acosta v. San Diego County, 272 P.2d 92, 93–94 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1954) (“[D]efendant contends that reservation Indians are not residents of the 
county for the purpose of obtaining [emergency welfare] relief.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Montoya v. Bolack, 372 P.2d 387, 394 (N.M. 1962) (“We are 
convinced that, for voting purposes, there is nothing in our constitution or in the 
statutes which prohibits an Indian from voting in a proper election, provided he 
fulfills the statutory requirements required of any other voter.”). 
 160. Opsahl, 138 Minn. at 45, 163 N.W. at 989. 
 161. Opsahl, 138 Minn. at 50–51, 163 N.W. at 991 (“We reach the conclusion that 
tribal Indians have not adopted the customs and habits of civilization, within the 
purview of the elective franchise provisions of our Constitution, until they have 
adopted that custom and habit which all other inhabitants must needs adopt when 
they come into the state, namely that of yielding obedience and submission to its laws.  
No doubt the right of suffrage was by this state held out as an inducement to the 
Indians to sever their tribal relations and adopt in all respects the habits and customs 
of civilization, and that means a taking up to the burdens which the laws of the state 
place upon all its inhabitants alike.  This the Indian may do by taking up his abode 
outside the reservation and there pursuing the customs and habits of civilization.”). 
 162. See, e.g., Porter v. Hall, 271 P. 411, 419 (Ariz. 1928) (“Whenever [the federal] 
government shall determine in regard to any Indian or class of Indians that they are 
[released from guardianship and placed in the ranks of citizens of the United States 
and of the state of their residence], and that their status in regard to the responsibili-
ties of citizenship is the same as that of any other citizen, the law of this state 
considers them no longer ‘persons under guardianship’ . . . and they will be entitled 
to vote on the same terms as all other citizens.  But so long as the federal government 
insists that, notwithstanding their citizenship, their responsibility under our law 
differs from that of the ordinary citizen, and that they are, or may be, regulated by 
that government, by virtue of its guardianship, in any manner different from that 
which may be used in the regulation of white citizens, they are, within the meaning of 
our constitutional provision, ‘persons under guardianship,’ and not entitled to 
vote.”); Allen v. Merrell, 305 P.2d 490, 495 (Utah 1956) (“There is nothing in the 
statute which prevents an Indian from becoming qualified to vote the same way as any 
other citizen.  All he has to do is to establish a residence in a part of the county where 
. . . he assumes his responsibilities as a citizen by living on lands where he pays taxes, 
either directly or through his rent, and otherwise removes the detachment and lack 
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One is left to wonder why the plaintiff-side interests involved in 
these cases—individual, tribal, pan-tribal, and non-Indian pro-
tribal—did not see the advantages of abstaining from participation in 
state voting, and concomitantly, how problematic seeking state voting 
rights was, especially in light of the position states had taken.  Seeking 
the right to vote meant agreeing that reservations were politically part 
of surrounding states.  If reservation territory equated to state 
territory, states could more legitimately assert authority there.  It was 
an “either/or” proposition if a coherent, normative paradigm based 
on commonly accepted democratic theory was anything but aban-
doned.  Either reservations were part of states, and reservation 
residents therefore state residents entitled to vote in state elections, or 
the reservations were not part of states, and reservation citizens 
belonged to separate territorial governments and had no voting rights 
in state elections.  The former meant states could exercise jurisdiction 
within the reservation; the latter meant they could not.  Any arrange-
ment where state and tribal governments co-exist raises the specter of 
multiple sovereignty, an inherent fallacy according to American 
governmental theory.163  Courts have asserted that federal, state, and 
tribal citizenship are not incompatible.164  Unfortunately, stating 
something—verbally or in a court opinion—does not make it so. 
More importantly, these cases represented an opportunity to 
show states and tribes that avoiding overlapping sovereignty was in 
each government’s best interest.  States could avoid being controlled 
by electorates not subject to their laws or obligated to provide the 
means to support government programs.  Conversely, tribes could 
avoid being subjected to state authority, and thereby be more 
autonomous.  In other words, states could not deny suffrage while 
asserting jurisdiction, and tribes could not demand suffrage while 
objecting to jurisdiction. 
It is important to note that a person with tribal ancestry is not 
necessarily politically “Indian.”  Such a person is genetically Indian, 
might be culturally “Indian,” and might even be entitled to tribal 
citizenship, but until enrollment, he or she forms no part of the tribal 
 
of interest in the affairs of the state which surrounds him on the reservation.”). 
 163. The problems implicit in dual sovereignty will be addressed infra, Parts III–
IV. 
 164. See, e.g., Halbert v. United States, 283 U.S. 753, 763 (1931) (“[T]here is no 
incompatibility between tribal membership and United States citizenship.”); United 
States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 598 (1916) (“Citizenship is not incompatible with tribal 
existence.”). 
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body politic.  A person merely ancestrally or culturally “Indian” who 
lives off-reservation deserves all the civil rights protections state and 
federal citizenship afford, including protection from racial discrimi-
nation in voting.  On the other hand, individuals that are politically 
“Indian”—i.e. enrolled tribal “members”—are citizens of another 
sovereign.  So long as that citizenship is kept separate, excluding 
tribal citizens from voting in state elections is as legitimate as Texans 
preventing citizens of Massachusetts from influencing the formation 
of Texas law by voting in Texas elections, and vice versa.  Trying to 
claim sovereign independence as a citizen of one government, while 
asserting civil rights protections under another government, 
represents a conflicted paradigm, absent some form of limitation on 
authority similar to the Tenth Amendment. 
III. CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED, CONSENT BY PARTICIPATION,  
THE HUMAN TENDENCY TO SEEK POWER, AND IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO:  
AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAL AXIOMS 
The fundamental tensions in federal law concerning tribes are: 
(1) how federal, tribal, and state sovereignty compete; and (2) how 
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of each sovereign 
attempt to resolve that competition.  Many non-tribal judges, officials, 
and scholars have characterized the relationship and history between 
these three sovereigns as “unique,” “special,” or “anomalous,” often in 
an effort to explain aspects of Indian law at odds with basic concepts 
of fairness and American democratic theory.165  This is sophistry.  
There is nothing new about sovereign competition.  The history 
between any two sovereigns is unique in some sense; nonetheless, the 
same sovereign dynamics, and therefore solutions, apply.  This is why 
the past is prologue;166 it can provide useful examples. 
The American Founding Fathers’ theoretical struggles and de-
bates represent one such useful “prologue” for tribes.  The Founders 
faced the same essential dilemma as tribes—how to create an 
 
 165. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“The sovereignty 
that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character.”); Washington v. 
Confederate Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500–01 (1979); 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–55 (1974) (describing the origin and nature of 
the “special relationship” between tribes and the federal government); United States 
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886) (upholding the Major Crimes Act and 
characterizing the relationship between Indian tribes and the United States as 
“anomalous” and “complex”). 
 166. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1. 
34
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss2/4
12  Oeser.docx 1/20/2010  9:32 PM 
2010] TRIBAL CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 827 
equitable, sustainable system of government encompassing multiple 
sovereigns that prevents one sovereign from swallowing another.  The 
Founders’ debates provide tribal proponents a tool with which to 
gauge the perception and consequences of tribal political participa-
tion in the forums where law affecting tribes is made, i.e. non-tribal 
American legislatures and courts.167  More importantly, the ways the 
Founders framed these issues still resonate with Americans today on 
an intuitive level.  This resonance provides tribal proponents a lexicon 
familiar to non-tribal interests with which to press tribal claims.  
Approaching these issues from this perspective also could provide 
advantages with courts that see “original intent” as their lodestar. 
A. The Centrality of Consent and Voting as a Means of Expressing It 
Much of the Founders’ concept of government came from the 
Enlightenment’s social contract theorists, particularly John Locke.168  
As Locke wrote: “Men Being . . . by nature all free, equal, and 
independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to 
the political power of another, without his own consent.”169  In 
Federalist No. 22, Alexander Hamilton wrote: “The fabric of Ameri-
can Empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the People.  
The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that 
 
 167. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 841, 844 (1990); Clinton, supra note 40, at 246–52; Johnson, supra note 47, at 
987–89; Richard A. Monette, Governing Private Property in Indian Country; The Double-
Edged Sword of the Trust Relationship and Trust Responsibility Arising Out of Early Supreme 
Court Opinions and the General Allotment Act, 25 N.M. L. REV. 35, 36 (1995) [hereinafter 
Monette, Governing Private Property in Indian Country]; Richard A. Monette, A New 
Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United States and Tribes in Light of 
Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 617, 623 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes]. 
 168. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
26–30 (1967); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 28–29 (3d ed. 2008); THOMAS L. 
PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL VISION OF THE AMERICAN 
FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE 2 (1988); Clinton, supra note 40, at 127 n.35; 
Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 3–6 (2005); Adam Mossoff, Locke’s Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 155, 155 (2002) (“A mere listing of the primary and secondary 
sources—from the Founding Fathers to today—that explicitly refer to Locke or 
implicitly invoke his ideas would rival the Encyclopaedia Britannica in length.  His 
labor argument for property, in particular, has been especially influential.”).  
 169. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER 
CONCERNING TOLERATION 49 (J.W. Gough ed., MacMillan 1946) (1690). 
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pure original fountainhead of all legitimate authority.”170  “[T]he only 
reason why a free and independent man was bound by human laws 
was this—that he bound himself.”171  “To be bound otherwise than by 
one’s own consent was to be reduced to slavery.”172  Some find fault 
with social contract theorists’ concept of consent,173 but scholarly 
arguments seem lost to popular acceptance, practicality, and sheer 
use of this conceptualization of consent in American government.174 
Judges, scholars, and philosophers from Locke to modern times 
have perceived the consent given by citizens and how it is expressed in 
several ways.  Citizens give what can be termed a general, initial 
consent to the form and authority of a government in one of two ways: 
(1) expressly, as through the naturalization process,175 or (2) implied-
ly,176 by maintaining a presence within the government’s territory and 
enjoying the benefits associated with that presence.177  However, 
 
 170. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) 
(emphasis in original). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 339 (James Madison) (J. 
Cooke ed. 1961); Clinton, supra note 167, at 844 (“[F]ederalist theory . . . generally 
viewed consent of the governed through the constitutional social contract as the 
fountainhead of governmental legitimacy.”).  Hamilton thought one of the 
weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation was that the people had never ratified 
them.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 145–46 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); 
THE FEDERALIST No. 49, 339 (James Madison); Johnson, supra note 47, at 978 n.24. 
 171. BAILYN, supra note 168, at 174 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 172. Johnson, supra note 47, at 979; see also BAILYN, supra note 168, at 234 (“[H]e 
who has authority ‘to restrain and control my conduct in any instance without my 
consent hath in all.’”). 
 173. See, e.g., A. John Simmons, Consent, Free Choice, and Democratic Government, 18 
GA. L. REV. 791, 802–03 (1984). 
 174. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Legal Culture War Against Tribal 
Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 104 (2007). 
 175. 8 U.S.C. §§1421–1458 (2006). 
 176. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT,  IN TWO TREATISES ON 
GOVERNMENT § 119 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (1698) (“[E]very Man, that hath any 
Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of any Government, doth 
thereby give his tacit Consent, and is as far forth obliged to Obedience to the Laws of 
that Government, during this Enjoyment, as anyone under it; whether this his Pos-
session be of Land, to him and his Heirs for ever, or a Lodging only for a Week; or 
whether it be barely travelling freely on the Highway . . . .”). 
 177. Birth constitutes a third type of implied general consent.  Consent is implied 
from birth in the territory, i.e. jus soli.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 880 (8th ed. 2004).  It 
is also implied from birth to a parent who is a citizen, i.e. jus sanguinis.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 880 (8th ed. 2004).  In reality, however, the unborn cannot consent to 
anything.  The same can be said for children in general until they become self 
sufficient enough to emigrate should they choose to do so, and assuming such 
migration is possible.  Consequently, this article limits itself to forms of consent that 
can be given or withheld freely. 
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citizens of a democratic government give another, more specific and 
equally important, type of consent—ongoing, broad-based political 
participation, including, but not limited to, voting. 
“[T]he colonial theorists developed the belief that representa-
tives to a legislative body are attorneys or agents of their constituents 
and accountable for the use of the power which is delegated to them.  
Representation so viewed implied the continuous day-by-day consent 
of the governed.”178  “Government . . . gain[s] its authority from [the 
people’s] continuous consent,”179 as expressed through voting.180  
“[C]onsent and the withholding of consent [are] the primary means 
of holding government accountable for its actions. . . . Accountability 
is not simply a response to crises or abuses, but rather is a feature of 
the routine conduct of the public policy process.”181  In other words, 
voting in periodic elections provides the mechanism through which 
Americans attempt to ensure that the government accurately and 
continuously reflects the will of the people.  U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Stephen Breyer calls this “active liberty,” i.e. “‘an active and 
constant participation in collective power’” and a “sharing of a 
nation’s sovereign authority among its people.”182  Professor Hill and 
Justice Breyer are far from alone in their perspectives.183 
B. Self-Interested Power Seeking and Imperium in Imperio 
Much has been written about the intensity of the disagreements 
preceding the adoption of our present Constitution.  Great men 
engaged in high-minded debates, newspaper articles traded barbs, 
and delegates took hostages to achieve quorum when necessary.184  
 
 178. Johnson, supra note 47, at 978. 
 179. BAILYN, supra note 1688, at 173. 
 180. Francis R. Hill, Putting Voters First: An Essay On The Jurisprudence Of Citizen 
Sovereignty In Federal Election Law, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 155, 158 (2006) (The consent 
that forms the basis of American government is “a process of continuing consent, 
expressed through continuing participation.”) (emphasis added). 
 181. Id. at 159. 
 182. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 5, 15 (2005). 
 183. See, e.g., J. P. PLAMENATZ, CONSENT, FREEDOM AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION 168, 
170–71 (2d ed. 1968) (“Where there is an established process of election to an office, 
then, provided the election is free, anyone who takes part in the process consents to the 
authority of whoever is elected to the office.”) (emphasis added); ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 11–14 (1948); 
PETER SINGER, DEMOCRACY AND DISOBEDIENCE  50–51 (1973); Alan Gewirth, Political 
Justice, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 137–38 (Richard B. Brandt ed. 1972). 
 184. CECELIA M. KENYON, MEN OF LITTLE FAITH: THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS ON THE 
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But as much as early Americans disagreed over the proposed Consti-
tution, it was what they agreed on from which we can learn the most in 
the present context.  The fact that the opposing sides agreed on 
certain principles of government gives some indication of the validity 
of these ideas.  Advocates both for and against the new Constitution 
had a clear idea of how much was at stake, the basic needs of the new 
nation, and the theoretical tensions at issue.  They disagreed mainly 
about whether the new Constitution sufficiently met those challenges, 
not what the challenges were. 
They agreed that human beings were self-interested and there-
fore power-seeking by nature. “Brutus,” considered one of the most 
well-reasoned and articulate of the Anti-Federalist essayists, wrote in 
1787: “[I]t is a truth confirmed by the unerring experience of ages, 
that every man, and every body of men, invested with power, are ever 
disposed to increase it, and to acquire a superiority over every thing 
that stands in their way.”185  Professor Jack N. Rakove of Stanford 
wrote: 
[This] presumption . . . bore the imprint of the ideology 
that had carried the colonists from resistance to revolution 
in the decade before independence: the belief that the in-
nate human craving for power would exploit any opportuni-
ty to exercise dominion. Create a constitution that merely 
permitted the abuse of power, this theory predicted, and 
those who wielded it would soon find and exploit its weakest 
points for their own insidious and ambitious ends.186 
They also agreed that if two sovereigns try to exert authority over 
the same people, territory, or both, at the same time, one will 
 
NATURE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1955), reprinted in  THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, at 
xxi–xxiv (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., Northeastern University Press 1985) (1966); THE 
ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE 
OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (1787), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, at 
27–28 (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., Northeastern University Press 1985) (1888); see also 
THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF 
PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, at 241 (Ralph Ketcham ed., insert 
publisher here 2003) (1986) (“The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of 
the Convention of Pennsylvania to their Constituents,” PENNSYLVANIA PACKET AND 
DAILY ADVERTISER, December 18, 1787). 
 185. “BRUTUS,” ESSAY I (1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, at 275 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2003) (1986) 
(“Brutus,” Essay I, New York Journal, Oct. 18, 1787). 
 186. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 182–83 (1996); see also KENYON, supra note 184, at xliv, lxii–lxv. 
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necessarily succumb to the other.187  Political commentators of the 
time referred to this concept as “imperium in imperio.”188  Any assertion 
to the contrary was an absurdity, a “solecism.”189  The Federalists 
accepted the validity of this concept, but thought the new Constitu-
tion sufficiently, although not completely, addressed the problem with 
its innovative approach to division of power—the reserved rights 
concept embodied in the Tenth Amendment.190  The Federalists 
thought the Anti-Federalists were simply too afraid of the novelty to 
try it.191 
 
 187. THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION 
OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 
PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, at 244 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 
2003) (1986); THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 184, at 244 (“The Address and 
Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to their 
Constituents . . . .”).  (“We apprehend that two co-ordinate sovereignties would be a 
solecism in politics. That therefore as there is no line of distinction drawn between 
the general, and state governments; as the sphere of their jurisdiction is undefined it 
would be contrary to the nature of things, that both should exist together, one or the 
other would necessarily triumph in the fullness of dominion.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 
20, at 134 (James Madison and Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) 
(“Federalist No. 20: The Same Subject Continued” (Madison with Hamilton)). 
 188. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 103 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
2003).  
 189. “1. Impropriety in language, or a gross deviation from the rules of syntax; 
incongruity of words; want of correspondence or consistency. A barbarism may be in 
one word; a solecism must be of more. 2. Any unfitness, absurdity or impropriety.”  
WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828). 
 190. The Tenth Amendment started out as a mainstay of Constitutional 
jurisprudence.  Patrick M. Garry, A One-Sided Federalism Revolution: The Unaddressed 
Constitutional Compromise on Federalism and Individual Rights, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 
851, 851–64, 873–77 (2006); David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Rediscovery 
of the Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 339, 339–78 (1996).  However, it became 
somewhat of a dead letter from the late 1930s to the mid 1990s.  Garry, supra, at 861–
66; Mayer, supra, at 379–410.  It has enjoyed somewhat of a revival since the 
Rehnquist Court.  Garry, supra, at 866-73; Mayer, supra, at 388-410. 
 191. RAKOVE, supra note 186, at 162 (citing 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 989, 995–96 (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1990) 
(Madison wrote that the “only way to judge the Constitution was to ‘consider it 
minutely in its parts’” while recognizing that ‘[i]t is in a manner unprecedented: We 
cannot find one express example in the experience of the world:—It stands by 
itself.’”); RAKOVE, supra note 1866, at 181; THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 103 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“Federalist No. 15: The Insufficiency of the 
Present Confederation to Preserve the Union” (Hamilton)) (“While [the Anti-
Federalists] admit that the government of the United States is destitute of energy, 
they contend against conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to supply 
that energy.  They seem still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable; at an 
augmentation of federal authority without a diminution of State authority; at 
sovereignty in the Union and complete independence in the members.  They still, in 
fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an imperium in 
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Interestingly, Anti-Federalists had some fairly specific ideas of 
how and how fast this consolidation would occur.  Two main theories 
existed.  Some thought the new Constitution squeezed the states out 
from the beginning;192 others thought the process would happen over 
time, bit by bit, federal law by federal law, federal judgment by federal 
judgment.193  “Brutus” thought the process would happen over time.  
“[A]lthough the government reported by the Convention does not go 
to a perfect and entire consolidation, yet it approaches so near to it, 
that it must, if executed, certainly and infallibly terminate in it.”194 
Five aspects of the proposed government represented the great-
est risk of consolidation of power, according to the Anti-Federalists: 
(1) the creation of a standing federal army, (2) the unlimited nature 
of the federal government’s authority to tax, (3) the malleability of 
the “Necessary and Proper” Clause, (4) the potential for abuse of the 
Supremacy Clause, and (5) the independence of the federal judi-
ciary.195  Anti-Federalists worried the states would have no revenue 
because any conflict between state and federal taxation would be 
trumped by the Supremacy Clause as interpreted by the Federal 
Judiciary and enforced by federal troops.  Anti-Federalists also 
thought the ambiguity of the Necessary and Proper Clause meant the 
legislative authority of the federal government would eventually be 
interpreted as boundless, and ultimately be used by federal courts 
again wielding the Supremacy Clause to abolish state laws at will, 
again backed up by federal forces.  In other words, the Anti-
Federalists thought they would end up having hostile federal laws 
 
imperio.”). 
 192. KENYON, supra note 184, at xlii–xliii. 
 193. RAKOVE, supra note 186, at 181 (“[C]onsolidation had two distinct meanings 
[to the Anti-Federalists]: one descriptive, one predictive. They did not entirely agree 
whether consolidation inhered in the ‘absolute and uncontroulable’ the Union would 
immediately possess over those ‘objects’ placed under its control; or whether it was 
better conceived as a tendency that would unfold gradually but ineluctable as the new 
government deployed its powers and monopolized the most productive sources of 
revenue to render the states impotent for all effective purposes of government.”).  
“Centinel,” an Anti-federalist essayist, wrote: “It is a solecism in politics for two co-
ordinate sovereignties to exist together, you must separate the sphere of their 
jurisdiction, or after running the race of dominion for some time, one would 
necessarily triumph over the other.”  CENTINEL NO. 5 (July 31, 1789), reprinted in 14 
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, at 343-48 
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983), available at 
http://www.consource.org/index.asp?bid=582&documented=270.  
 194. “BRUTUS,” ESSAY I (1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 271 (Ralph Ketcham ed.) (1986). 
 195. RAKOVE, supra note 186, at 183–88; KENYON, supra note 184, at xlii–xlvii. 
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broadly interpreted and unilaterally imposed on their states with their 
only recourse being to a biased court196—a proposition strikingly 
similar to that faced by tribes today. 
IV. COUNTING THE GREEKS IN THE HORSE: PARSING THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF TRIBAL PARTICIPATION IN NON-TRIBAL POLITICS 
Part II began this article with an examination of what tribes and 
tribal citizens have gained through participation in non-tribal politics.  
Part IV will close the substantive sections of this article with the other 
side of the equation—how tribes risk their sovereignty by participat-
ing. 
A. Tribal Consent to Non-Tribal Authority 
Without question, tribes and tribal citizens have fully and volun-
tarily engaged in the kinds of “active liberty” that constitute consent to 
be governed by both state and national government.  They have 
fervently sought, at incredible time and expense, to be included in the 
“process of continuing consent, expressed through continuing 
participation.”197  Their efforts have been aimed at being part of the 
electorate to whom elected officials are accountable, and whose will 
those officials are supposed to reflect, under pain of loss of office.  
They engage in the exact same activities non-tribal communities do 
and direct those activities at the same institutions non-tribal citizens 
do with increasing success. 
Individuals with tribal ancestry who are not enrolled in a tribe 
and do not live on the tribe’s reservation provide a useful foil and 
point of analytical departure.  Individuals that fit this description have 
no nexus with tribal government.  They are not part of the tribal body 
politic and do not live in the territory governed by the tribe.  Conse-
quently, they present no opportunity for tribal government to conflict 
 
 196. With regard to the proposed powers of the Supreme Court, “Brutus” wrote 
that they would, “operate to effect, in the most certain, but yet silent and impercepti-
ble manner, what is evidently the tendency of the constitution—I mean, an entire 
subversion of the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the individual states. 
Every adjudication of the supreme court, on any question that may arise upon the 
nature and extent of the general government, will affect the limits of the state 
jurisdiction.  In proportion as the former enlarge the exercise of their powers, will 
that of the latter be restricted.  BRUTUS, ESSAY XI (1788), reprinted in THE ANTI-
FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 296 (Ralph 
Ketcham ed., Mentor Pub. 2003) (1986).  
 197. See Hill, supra note 180. 
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with another sovereign, state or national.  They are only genetically, 
and possibly culturally, “Indian,” but not politically.  Non-tribal anti-
discrimination laws, like the Voting Rights Act, legitimately protect 
the rights of these individuals within the sovereigns to which they 
belong. 
Tribal citizens, on the other hand, are politically “Indian.”  When 
tribal citizens participate in state and federal politics, they literally 
embody the unification of tribal, state, and federal sovereignty.  Their 
participation amounts to consent to be governed by all three, 
bringing tribal sovereignty into conflict with federal and state 
sovereignty.  If tribal citizens reside on the reservation when they 
participate—i.e. if they are reservation citizens—they invite state 
government onto the reservation, validating existing assertions of 
non-tribal authority there and inviting future assertions.198  The 
problem manifests when these individuals, or non-Indians within 
tribal territory, are presented with conflicting laws. In such a situation, 
which do they follow, and which will be enforced by the courts?  Over 
time, which laws will generally dominate, giving force to the customs 
and values of the culture that made them?  This conflict is played out 
throughout the body of Indian law.199 
 
 198. Participation in tribal political processes by tribal citizens who live off 
reservation presents an interesting and problematic inverse corollary.  See infra Part 
IV.C.2.; S.E. Ruckman, Creeks Step Closer to Constitutional Amendment, NATIVE AM. TIMES, 
Jan. 30, 2009, at 1. 
 199. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (holding that 
inherent sovereignty did not enable the Tribe to regulate non-Indian hunting and 
fishing in taken areas); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that an Indian 
tribe may not assert criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian); Brendale v. 
Confederate Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (holding 
that the tribe had authority to zone property in areas of its reservation that were 
closed to the general public); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 
202, 215 (1987) (holding state and local laws may be applied to on-reservation 
activities of tribes and tribal members, even though not expressly authorized by 
Congress, when state authority is not pre-empted by the operation of federal law; pre-
emption occurs when state jurisdiction interferes or is incompatible with federal and 
tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless state interests at stake are sufficient to 
justify the assertion of state authority); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 
(1981) (holding that the Crow Indian Tribe had no power to regulate non-Indian 
fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of the Tribe); 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980) (quoting 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1831)) (holding state motor carrier 
and fuel tax pre-empted from application to logging company doing business with 
tribe in tribal territory); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) 
(holding that Indian tribal courts do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction to try 
and punish non-Indians for crimes committed on a reservation); McClanahan v. Ariz. 
State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (holding Arizona income tax inapplica-
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The establishment of state legislative districts within reservations, 
and the election of reservation citizens to represent those districts, 
essentially, if not literally, make reservations part of the surrounding 
state and suggest that tribes consent to state authority.200  By sending a 
reservation citizen to the state legislature to represent a district that 
encompasses reservation lands, tribes put themselves on the same 
level with other political subdivisions of the state over which the state 
has considerable authority.  Equating reservation lands with state 
political subdivisions marginalizes the perception of tribes as separate 
governments with independent sovereign powers, and makes them 
appear more like counties and cities, i.e. simple organizational 
substructures incorporated under the authority of the state and 
subject to that authority. 
The one political activity that tribes can, and historically have, 
engaged in that does not amount to consent to be governed is 
lobbying.  Tribes have advocated their position to non-tribal govern-
ments and communities since first contact without such behavior 
being seen as categorically unfair201 or an implied invitation to govern.  
Tribes and non-tribal governments termed these efforts as “negotia-
tions” when tribes were universally seen as separate; “lobbying” is just 
the name they have been given since non-tribal governments laid 
sovereign claim to tribal citizens and lands. 
Some might assert that concerns about the consequences of par-
ticipation are merely theoretical, that the Supreme Court has shown a 
willingness to give some measure of substance to tribal sovereignty, 
that federal policy at the moment supports self-determination, and 
that Congress has clearly rejected the extinction of tribes as a goal.  
These observations do provide a measure of reassurance.  However, 
 
ble to reservation citizen who derived all her income from reservation sources);  
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (holding that state statutes control in the Cherokee 
town of New Echota, which overlapped with Gwinnett county, Georgia); Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (denying an injunction to restrain the 
State of Georgia from executing and enforcing the laws of Georgia within the 
Cherokee territory). 
 200. Such annexation is usually considered an act of war absent consent.  James P. 
Terry, The President as Commander in Chief, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 391, 455 (2009) 
(describing Iraq annexation/occupation of Kuwait); Robert D. Sloane, The Changing 
Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 107, 
134 (2002) (describing Chinese annexation of Tibet); Shaun Walker, Ossetians Warm 
to Moscow’s Embrace, INDEP. ON SUNDAY, Aug. 9, 2009, at News (describing Russian 
annexation of part of Georgia). 
 201. Some question the fairness of tribes being able to donate in the amounts 
recently seen, but few, if any, have questioned the ability of tribes to lobby generally. 
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these machinations of imperium in imperio are best seen from the 
“forest” level over time,202 and the U.S. Supreme Court has increasing-
ly used participation-based reasoning—as opposed to territory-based 
or Indian/non-Indian race-based reasoning—to resolve sovereignty 
conflicts contrary to tribal interests. 
The Court has clearly relied on participation-based reasoning in 
the area of tribal criminal jurisdiction,203 stating reluctance “to adopt a 
view of tribal sovereignty that would single out [a] group of citizens, 
nonmember Indians, for trial by political bodies that do not include 
them.”204  The Supreme Court just as clearly relied on participation-
based reasoning in the area of tribal regulatory authority over non-
citizens.  The rules for determining the extent of a tribe’s authority 
within its own territory turn in part on whether non-tribal citizens and 
non-Indian lands are involved.205  Tribes’ inherent civil regulatory 
authority generally does not apply to “nonmembers” on “non-Indian” 
land and extends only to what is “necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations.”206  In a case about land-
use regulation, the Court explicitly compared reservation citizens and 
non-Indian residents in terms of population, land ownership, ability 
to vote in county elections, ability to vote in tribal elections, and 
access to tribal services.207  The Court has made member/nonmember 
 
 202. See infra Part IV.B. 
 203. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Court made specific note of the 
large non-Indian presence on the reservation in terms of both land ownership and 
population, and that nonmembers could not serve on tribal juries.  435 U.S. 191, 193 
n.1, 193–94, 194 n.4 (1978).  Oliphant ultimately held that the exercise by tribes of 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians was “inconsistent with [tribes’] status” and 
contrary to the federal government’s “great solicitude that its citizens be protected by 
the United States from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty.”  Id. at 208, 
210 (emphasis in original).  Duro v. Reina similarly concluded that jurisdiction over 
nonmember Indians is an “external” power “inconsistent with the Tribe’s dependent 
status.”  495 U.S. 676, 684, 686 (1990).  Duro explicitly based part of its reasoning on 
the inability of nonmember Indians to participate in the government prosecuting 
them.  Id. at 693–94; see, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme 
Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 665–68 (2003) (explaining 
that the longstanding notion of “retained inherent sovereignty . . . is compatible with 
core American values”).  Interestingly, participation concerns do not factor in the 
state context, or even the international context, absent obvious disparities in 
procedural protections.  See also COHEN, supra note 45, at 226–28. 
 204. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693. 
 205. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997); Brendale, 492 U.S. at 446; 
Montana, 450 U.S. at 563–65; see also COHEN, supra note 45, at 229–32 (explaining that 
it matters whether tribal or non-citizens are involved). 
 206. Montana, 450 U.S. at 563–65. 
 207. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 445–47. 
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demographics a factor to consider in diminishment cases where 
guidance is not found from treaties, statutes, or legislative history.208 
Admittedly, these cases and rules use demographics to make 
needed divisions between tribal and state sovereignty, but the balance 
of power has fallen much farther in favor of the opposing sovereignty 
than in other non-tribal contexts.  If a court or legislature sought to 
justify further state authority inside reservations, it would be a simple 
matter to shift the focus of inquiry from how non-tribal citizens 
cannot participate in tribal political processes, to how tribal citizens 
consent to state authority by participating in state political processes.  
Such a shift represents a legitimate hazard given the susceptibility of 
federal Indian law to changes in federal policy and non-tribal courts’ 
willingness to rationalize that policy.209  Moreover, tribes are not well 
positioned from an advocacy standpoint to counter such a shift given 
that willingness to participate in a democratic process equates to a 
willingness to be bound by the products of that process. 
B. Imperium in Imperio: A Cancer in Indian Country 
Tribal consent to state and federal authority via participation 
brings the problem of multiple sovereignties squarely into play.210  
Unfortunately, the problem faced by tribes is more complicated than 
that faced by the Founders.  In the federal-state context, federal 
sovereignty overlaps the sovereignty of each state, but states do not 
overlap each other individually.  This limited the difficulty faced by 
The Founders to coherently segregating authority between two 
sovereign spheres, not three.  Participation by tribes in federal and 
state elections creates a three-way competition for governance for 
which no stable or coherent, i.e., normative, answer presently exists.  
The Marshallian conception of the relationship between these 
 
 208. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 356–57 (1998); Solem v. 
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470–72 nn.12–13 (1984) (“When an area is predominately 
populated by non-Indians with only a few surviving pockets of Indian allotments, 
finding that the land remains Indian country seriously burdens the administration of 
State and local governments. . . . Resort to subsequent demographic history is, of 
course, an unorthodox and potentially unreliable method of statutory interpretation.  
However, in the area of surplus land acts, where various factors kept Congress from 
focusing on the diminishment issue, technique is a necessary expedient.”); Rosebud 
Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 602–14 (1977). 
 209. See infra Part IV.B. 
 210. One federal official during the allotment period used the term “imperium in 
imperio” to describe the tribal sovereign dilemma 125 years ago.  Gates, supra note 79, 
at 49 (“Politically [the tribe] is an anomaly—an imperium in imperio.”). 
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spheres of sovereignty kept them relatively separate.  However, they 
have gone from a position of relative separation to substantial overlap, 
resulting in steady losses of tribal sovereignty via judicial decision, 
along much the same lines as Anti-Federalists feared would result 
under the present U.S. Constitution. 
The Founders originally thought of tribes and tribal territories as 
entirely separate up to the point that the federal government 
extinguished a tribe’s right of occupancy.211  Chief Justice John 
Marshall had great “conceptual clarity”212 about the division between 
tribes, states, and the federal government, stating that (1) tribal 
territory was distinct from state territory, (2) states did not have 
authority in tribal territory and state citizens could not venture there 
without permission from the tribe or the federal government, and (3) 
the federal government had exclusive authority to deal with tribes, but 
none to regulate their internal affairs.213  The Court since has 
consistently confirmed tribal authority over its citizens and their 
activities within the tribal territory;214 however, exercises of tribal 
sovereignty in this context do not compete with any other sovereign.  
Competition occurs when tribes assert authority over non-Indians or 
non-citizen Indians within tribal territory, or states assert any type of 
authority within tribal territory.  Tribal authority in these contexts has 
steadily diminished.215 
The broadest rejection of tribal jurisdiction over non-citizens 
came in the criminal area.  In 1978, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe,216 the U.S. Supreme Court held that tribes lacked any amount of 
criminal jurisdiction over “non-Indians” regardless of where jurisdic-
tion was asserted (e.g., Indian fee land, tribally held land, federally 
 
 211. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560 (1832); supra note 31. 
 212. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973). 
 213. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. 
 214. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71–72 (1978); United States v. 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1978).  The powers of Indian tribes are not 
delegated, but instead are “inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never 
been extinguished.”  Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322–23 (quoting FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945) (“Indian tribes still possess those aspects of 
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result 
of their dependent status.”);  id. at 323 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 
435 U.S. 191 (1978)). 
 215. COHEN, supra note 45, at 220, 224–37 (“[B]eginning in 1978, the Supreme 
Court has substantially limited tribal power over nonmembers.”; “[Nevada v.] Hicks fits 
within the recent trend of decisions disfavoring tribes’ power to govern the conduct 
of nonmembers . . . .”). 
 216. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
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held land, or non-Indian fee land).217  In contrast, the Supreme Court 
has generally upheld tribal assertions of regulatory authority over non-
citizens within tribal territory so long as the land where the assertion 
occurs is held by the tribe, the federal government, or a tribal 
citizen.218  However, the presumption reverses on non-Indian fee 
land219 and public rights-of-way.220  In 1981, the Court wrote that 
“exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal 
self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with 
the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without 
express congressional delegation.”221  Exceptions exist for non-citizens 
entering “consensual relationships,” and “conduct [that] threatens or 
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, 
or the health or welfare of the tribe.”222  At first glance, the rule and 
exceptions seem capable of broad interpretation, akin to the “health, 
safety and welfare” phrasing of broadly construed state police powers.  
Unfortunately, interpretations in 1997 and 2001 have taken a 
narrower position.223 
Turning to where states have sought to assert jurisdiction within 
tribal territory, the U.S. Supreme Court backed away from “reliance 
on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty” in the early 1970s.224  In the 
1980s, the Court acknowledged that it had fully “departed from Mr. 
Chief Justice Marshall’s view that ‘the laws of [a State] can have no 
force’ within reservation boundaries,” abandoning a “rigid rule” in 
 
 217. See also supra note 196 (explaining Oliphant’s implications on criminal 
jurisdiction non-Indians).  The Court later expanded this to prohibit tribal 
jurisdiction over non-citizen Indians.  Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S 676 (1990).  Congress 
quickly authorized tribal jurisdiction in such circumstances.  25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) 
(2006); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). 
 218. Montana v. United  States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981).  Cf. Brendale v. 
Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 433–48 
(suggesting that limitation of access by the general public to non-citizen fee lands is 
sufficient for tribal regulatory authority). 
 219. Montana, 450 U.S. at 563–65. 
 220. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454–56 (1997) (state highway 
equated to non-Indian fee land for purposes of determining adjudicative jurisdiction; 
neither Montana exception met; not consensual because suit sounded in tort; not the 
contract that brought the defendant into tribal territory; provision of governmental 
services not sufficient to be meet consensual exception). 
 221. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564. 
 222. Id. at 565-66. 
 223. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 438; Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647 
(2001) (Navaho Tribe could not tax non-Indian guests of hotel located on non-Indian 
fee land); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); see also COHEN, supra note 45, at 220, 
224–37. 
 224. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). 
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favor of a balancing approach that allowed consideration of state 
interests in deciding whether to enforce state laws within tribal 
territory.225  More recently, Justice Scalia forcefully stated that “[s]tate 
sovereignty does not end at a reservation’s border,”226 thus marking 
“the decline and fall” of Marshallian conceptual clarity.227  Tribal 
sovereignty now forms a mere “backdrop” against which state, federal, 
and tribal interests are all considered.228  Sometimes the balance 
weighs in favor of tribes;229 sometimes it does not.230  Standard 
conceptions of sovereignty no longer provide a “definitive resolu-
tion”231 to issues that would be simple questions in the state-state 
context.232  At one point, a third of the Supreme Court suggested a 
 
 225. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, at 141–45 (1980) 
(quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 515, 520 (1832)).  State motor 
carrier and fuel tax pre-empted from application to logging company doing business 
with tribe in tribal territory); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 
202, at 215–16 (1987) (holding that state and local laws may be applied to on-
reservation activities of tribes and tribal members, even though not expressly 
authorized by Congress, when state authority is not pre-empted by the operation of 
federal law; noting that pre-emption occurs when state “jurisdiction interferes or is 
incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless state 
interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority”) (quoting 
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983)); see also South 
Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993). 
 226. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361–62.  Hicks appears to be very nearly a polar opposite of 
Worcester.  Where Chief Justice John Marshall drew a line in the sand when Georgia 
reached into Cherokee Territory, Justice Scalia trumpeted the breach of the Fallon 
Paiute-Shoshone Tribe’s border when Nevada law enforcement rushed into Fallon 
Paiute-Shoshone Tribe’s Territory. 
 227. THOMAS T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 112–13 (2002). 
 228. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 (1973) (“The Indian sovereignty doctrine is 
relevant . . . because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and 
federal statutes must be read.”); Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143 (citing McClanahan, 411 U.S. 
at 164). 
 229. E.g., Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 202 (finding the state lacked sufficient interest to 
regulate bingo activities on tribal land); Bracker, 448 U.S. at 136 (finding federal law 
preempted state tax on tribal logging operations); McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 164 
(finding income tax on Indians unlawful as applied to income wholly derived from 
reservation activities). 
 230. E.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (holding 
the state could impose severance taxes on reservation oil production by non-Indian 
lessees); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 
134, 154–59 (1980) (permitting the state to tax non-Indians’ purchases of cigarettes 
from on-reservation tribal retailers); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of 
Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 481–83 (1976) (permitting state cigarette tax on 
Indian sales to non-Indians). 
 231. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172. 
 232. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 227, at 110 (“States are generally understood to have 
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rule that state regulation of commercial reservation activities that are 
unlawful under state law is permissible unless and until Congress 
indicates otherwise.233 
Taking a broader perspective on the matter, these losses have 
come in a manner eerily similar to how the Anti-Federalists thought 
the federal government would consume the states over time, support-
ing the assertion that imperium in imperio is at least partially to blame.  
Since the clear Marshallian construction of tribal sovereignty, tribes 
have lost pieces of sovereignty, bit by bit, law by law, judgment by 
judgment: the ability to protect their citizens from crime regardless of 
the perpetrator’s race (1854, 1885, 1946, 1978, 1990),234 the ability to 
manage and protect their environment by uniform regulation 
throughout their territory (1989),235 the ability to develop their 
economies and infrastructures through exclusive uniform taxation 
(1980, 1989, 2001, 2005),236 basic respect for their borders (1903, 
 
the authority to regulate (and tax) the activities of non-Indians on reservations; . . . .  
This analysis, of course, differs significantly from principles of federalism and comity 
that underlie relationships among the states and between states and the federal 
government.  A citizen of Montana who ventures to Wyoming is fully subject to 
Wyoming civil and criminal jurisdiction, and federal power cannot generally provide 
Montanans immunity from Wyoming courts for a crime committed in Cheyenne . . . .  
American constitutional law does not treat these as difficult questions.”). 
 233. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 222–27 (Stevens, J., O’Connor, J., and Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 234. Indian Country Crimes Act of 1854, ch. 24, § 3, 10 Stat. 270 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2008)) (extending the general laws of the United 
States  to offenses committed by non-Indians in Indian country); Major Crimes Act of 
1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362–85 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2008)) 
(removing  tribal jurisdiction over a set of “major” crimes committed by Indians 
against Indians); Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–511, 104 Stat. 1892–93 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2001)) (restoring tribal jurisdiction 
over non-member Indians); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (holding the 
Double Jeopardy Clause could not bar federal prosecution of a non-member Indian 
in Federal Court despite the defendant having been punished in tribal court); Duro 
v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (finding tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (finding 
tribes lack inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians); Williams v. United States, 
327 U.S. 724 (1946) (finding federal laws covering rape applicable to Indian 
reservations through the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13). 
 235. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 
408 (1989) (limiting tribal authority to zone fee land located within reservation but 
owned by non-Indians). 
 236. Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 99 (2005) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (permitting state tax on off-reservation receipt of motor 
fuel by non-Indian fuel distributors who delivered to station owned by Indians on 
Indian land).  “Both the Nation and the State have authority to tax fuel sales at the 
[tribe-owned gas station].  As a practical matter, however, the two tolls cannot coexist.  
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1960, 1998, 2001),237 and the ability to protect their citizens from the 
unlawful assertions of authority by foreign governments (2001).238  
Moreover, clear analogies exist between these losses and Anti-
Federalist concerns regarding competition for tax revenue, broad 
interpretations of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and abuse of the 
Supremacy Clause by federal courts.  There is no reason to think 
these losses will end before little remains for tribes to govern in their 
own territories. 
C. Alternatives to Passive Sovereign Erosion 
If tribal participation brings tribal sovereignty into conflict with 
federal and state sovereignty in the absence of a limiting factor like 
the Tenth Amendment, and those conflicts will result in continued 
losses of sovereignty over time, two questions present themselves: 
“What can tribes do, if anything?” and “What should tribes do, if 
anything?”  As the current course of tribal participation seems 
destined to erode tribal sovereignty with no tribal control of the 
process, the two alternatives appear to be: (1) active pursuit of 
incorporation, or (2) active pursuit of some measure of separation.  
 
If the Nation imposes its tax on top of Kansas’ tax, then unless the Nation operates 
[its gas station] at a substantial loss, scarcely anyone will fill up at its pumps.  
Effectively double-taxed, the [gas station] must operate as an unprofitable venture, or 
not at all.”  Id. at 116 (citations omitted).  See also Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 
U.S. 645, 653–59 (2001) (finding tribe lacked authority to impose hotel taxes on non-
Indian guests at hotel located on non-Indian fee land within the reservation); Cotton 
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S 163 (1989) (finding concurrent state and 
tribal jurisdiction with regard to the imposition of severance taxes on oil and gas 
production by non-members); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (finding concurrent jurisdiction of state and tribal 
governments to tax cigarette purchases by non-members).  
 237. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (finding tribal court lacked 
jurisdiction to try tort claims arising from state officials investigation of off-reservation 
crime on the reservation); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 
99 (1960) (permitting government taking of Indian fee land for hydraulic power 
project); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–67 (1903) (finding Congress has 
authority to abrogate treaties with Indians); United States v. Brisk, 171 F.3d 514, 520–
21 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding non-enclave federal drug law enforceable on tribal land 
because the law did not impermissibly affect the rights of Indians); see generally 
COHEN, supra note 45, at 128–32; Alex Tallchief Skibine, Applicability of Federal Laws of 
General Application to Indian Tribes and Reservation Indians, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 
(1991) (arguing that an overriding national interest must exist to apply silent federal 
laws, on a matter not cover by  treaty, to Indian nations). 
 238. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (finding tribal court lacked jurisdiction 
to try tort claims arising from state officials investigation of off-reservation crime on 
the reservation). 
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Decisions239 need to be made on both the federal and state levels. 
1. The Federal-Tribal Relationship 
Considerable hurdles stand in the way of tribes formally incorpo-
rating into the federal union as “States of the Union,” foremost being 
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution—”no new 
State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other 
State.”240  Arguments could be made regarding whether reservations 
are “within” a state, but the success of any such effort is doubtful 
without amending the Federal Constitution, which is improbable. 
A return to a measured separation based on negotiated treaties 
would be the simplest alternative to adopt, but also presents consider-
able hurdles.  Precedent for such a relationship exists—everything 
prior to 1871—and this approach could adequately limit federal 
authority if a credible retained-rights approach is applied to treaty 
interpretation.241  However, two time-honored sources of guidance 
suggest that pursuing this approach will be unsuccessful—history and 
common sense.  Historically, non-tribal interests have proven unable 
to honor treaty agreements and non-tribal courts have consistently 
increased the breadth of federal and state authority over tribes and 
tribal lands.  On the common sense front, a return to treaty-making is 
unlikely so long as tribal citizens continue to participate in federal 
political processes; governments do not negotiate treaties with their 
own citizens. 
On the other hand, significant arguments can be marshaled for 
continued federal participation.  Little reason exists to believe that 
federal lawmaking with regard to tribes will suddenly cease, or that 
tribes will abruptly be exempted from all federal laws of “general 
 
 239. “Decisions” in this context could take many forms.  All decisions affecting the 
political/governmental substance of the body politic should receive approval from 
the body politic in some form. 
 240. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 3, cl. 1. 
 241. See, e.g., Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322–23 (1978) (holding that the powers of 
Indian tribes are not delegated, but instead are “‘inherent powers of a limited sovereignty 
which has never been extinguished.[;]’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting COHEN ‘S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945)).  “Indian tribes still possess those 
aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a 
necessary result of their dependent status.”  Id. at 323 (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191 
(1978))); see also United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380–81 (1905) (holding that 
treaties are not “a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of right from them—a 
reservation of those not granted”).  
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applicability.”242  Consequently, if those controlled by the products of 
a government’s political processes have a right to participate in those 
processes, then tribal citizens have a right to participate in federal 
political processes.  While this reasoning has an uncomfortable “self-
fulfilling” aspect, it makes sense and may be unavoidable.  However, 
for continued federal participation to work long term, an answer to 
the imperium in imperio problem must be found. 
The details of a new federal-tribal relationship exceed the scope 
of this article, but some contours can be sketched.  The first step 
would be recognizing the illegitimacy of plenary power, legally and 
ethically.  It has no basis in the Constitution, and runs contrary to any 
concept of limited federal power or government by consent.  It was 
adopted by a Court seeking to rationalize a federal policy antithetical 
to tribal sovereignty, and as such represents a kind of judicial activism 
criticized in other contexts.   
The second step would be repealing the grants of authority made 
under Public Law 280 absent tribal consent.  Again, these grants run 
contrary to the concept that a legitimate government must be based 
on the consent of those governed.   
Third, sustainable federal participation would require returning 
to a credible retained rights analysis of treaties as envisioned by United 
States v. Wheeler243and United States v. Winans.244  This would largely serve 
the same purpose the Tenth Amendment serves between the federal 
government and the states.  Alternatively, federal and tribal govern-
ments could negotiate a new affirmative uniform boundary for federal 
power vis-à-vis the tribes, modeled after Tenth Amendment.   
Fourth, a sustainable federal-tribal relationship based on mutual 
respect and consent would require retrocession of governmental 
authority over all lands located within the exterior boundaries of all 
reservations.  Tribes lost their exclusive authority over these lands as 
the result of unilateral and vulgar assertions of power—the Indian 
Country Crimes Act, the Assimilative Crimes Act, the Major Crimes 
Act, General Allotment Act and various Termination Acts.  Without 
such a retrocession, allotment and termination have never truly 
ended because the consequences of these policies—the destruction 
 
 242. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116–17 
(1960) (holding that general acts of Congress with terms applying to all people 
include Indians); COHEN, supra note 45, at 128–32; Skibine, supra note 237. 
 243. 435 U.S. at 322–23. 
 244. 198 U.S. at 381 (holding that treaties are not “a grant of rights to the Indians, 
but a grant of right from them, a reservation of those not granted”). 
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of tribal territories—have been perpetuated.  Any argument defend-
ing the status quo simply makes the arguer complicit in the original 
unjust act.245 
Some authors have expressed concern that participating in fed-
eral political processes will essentially hollow out tribes, culturally and 
governmentally.246  However, evidence that culture can survive 
incorporation into the federal fabric exists—the states themselves.  
One of the goals of the American federal arrangement was to allow 
individual states to retain their individual culture and law by only 
establishing as much centralized government as was necessary and 
leaving the states as much authority as possible to control their own 
dominions.247  Disagreement can be had about the level of success the 
United States has achieved on this front,248 but no one thinks the 
cultures of California, Texas, Georgia, Iowa, New York, or Massachu-
setts are the same.  The real danger of loss of culture comes from 
incorporation into state government, where the American federal 
arrangement left the “vast inherency” of authority to embody culture 
in law. 
2. Choosing to Incorporate with the States 
Tribes that see continued participation in state politics as desira-
ble, or possibly unavoidable, might wonder why there is any practical 
or ethical need for them to change the status quo.  On the contrary, 
both a practical and an ethical reason to affirmatively seek incorpora-
tion exist.  Practically speaking, most tribes’ current course of action 
will ultimately result in their incorporation into surrounding states, 
but will not afford them much, if any, control over the outcome of 
that incorporation.  Absent affirmative tribal action, the federal 
 
 245. True abandonment of these policies would not mean non-citizen reservation 
residents would have to leave the reservation.  It would only mean that they would be 
subject to tribal authority, just like anyone else who owns land or resides in a state or 
nation of which he or she is not a citizen. 
 246. See Porter, The Demise, supra note 13, at 171–72 (explaining that as more 
Indians become involved in the federal political process, these individuals feel like 
participants within the federal political system, rather than peoples outside of the 
federal political process diplomatically involved as part of a sovereign Indigenous 
nation); Porter, Two Kinds of Indians, supra note 13, at 642 (expressing the belief that 
the very fact that many Indians view themselves as American citizens is evidence that 
such individuals are now “Native American” instead of Ongwehoweh). 
 247. See generally THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note184, at xli–xlii (explaining that 
the Antifederalists failed to understand the Constitution proposed a government of 
limited powers that would not “stamp out diversity” or “require uniformity”). 
 248. See supra note 190. 
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government—either Congress or the courts—will likely one day 
implicitly, or possibly explicitly, hollow out tribal sovereignty as the 
logical conclusion of tribes’ perceived consent to non-tribal authority 
by participation and the imperium in imperio problem.  By not affirma-
tively choosing to incorporate, tribes give up bargaining position that 
could be used to secure advantages of sovereignty that might not 
survive incorporation otherwise. 
Right now, tribes have a measure of independence that states 
generally oppose.  That independence represents something the 
states want, or more accurately, want to eliminate.  However, if tribes 
continue to participate in state politics without seeking some segrega-
tion of authority, tribal independence will likely one day disappear as 
a result of the state-tribal competition for sovereignty, thus dissolving 
any previous bargaining advantage.  Alternatively, tribes could 
affirmatively seek to incorporate into the surrounding state but make 
incorporation contingent on the preservation of some measure of the 
advantages they enjoyed prior to incorporation.  Tribes pursuing this 
course would also need to make sure any such concessions could not 
easily be undone post incorporation.  Examples of advantages tribes 
might preserve would be legalizing certain types of gaming that would 
otherwise be prohibited, control of environmental standards within 
the former tribal territory, preservation of hunting rights, preserva-
tion of fishing rights, and preservation of sacred sites.  Tribes might 
also be able to preserve access to specific federal benefits, like the 
Indian Health Service.249  Tribes would likely be unable to preserve 
exemptions from state taxation, but states would also assume respon-
sibility for spending those taxes for the benefit of the former tribal 
citizens and the former reservation area.  Admittedly, securing these 
advantages might prove politically and legally difficult. That difficulty 
will need to be part of the equation in deciding whether or not to 
incorporate. 
 
 249. The tribe would cease to be politically autonomous, but federal benefits are 
not necessarily dependent on enrollment.  See Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 
U.S. 73, 84–86 (1977) (holding Congress’ exclusion of group of Indians from 
receiving share of distribution of tribal assets permissible where decision is “‘tied 
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians’”); 
Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415, 423–25 (1907) (holding that Congress can authorize 
review of citizen determinations by tribal courts); Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. 
Supp. 808, 813–15 (E.D. Wash. 1965), aff’d, 384 U.S. 209 (1966) (denying heirship 
and benefits under statute defining tribal membership as enrolled members with a 
minimum quantity of Indian blood); Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs 
and the Federal Trust Obligation to American Indians, 19 BYU J. Pub. L. 1, 121 (2004). 
54
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss2/4
12  Oeser.docx 1/20/2010  9:32 PM 
2010] TRIBAL CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 847 
From an ethical point of view, tribes choosing not to affirmatively 
seek either incorporation or separation create opportunities for 
federal courts to further undermine the sovereignty of all tribes.  
Cases resulting from the continued conflict between state and tribal 
sovereignty affect the destiny of all tribes and could affect the 
sovereignty of tribes in the process of trying to separate from state 
government.  Attempts to avoid litigation will to some extent limit the 
chance of an adverse decision, but avoidance will not always be 
possible.  The possibility exists that the actions of tribes choosing to 
continue participating but not incorporating will hasten the erosion 
of tribal sovereignty faster than tribes making different choices can 
prepare for that erosion. 
3. Choosing Some Measure of Separation 
Tribes can also avoid piecemeal destruction of their sovereignty 
by creating some measure of separation from state government.  Two 
possibilities for doing this are: (1) segregation of authority, similar to 
what the Tenth Amendment does between the state and federal 
governments; or (2) comprehensive sovereign separation from the 
surrounding state, similar to the separation states have from each 
other.  The goals may be simple to point out, but it is no secret that 
seeking any such separation will be difficult.  Tribes have inherited a 
long history of comprehensive antagonism to their independence.  
Changing the trajectory of tribal sovereignty—changing the assump-
tions about whether tribal governments deserve the same rules and 
respect that state governments do—will take similar clear, compre-
hensive, consistent action, just like modification of any long-standing 
belief or behavior. 
a. Measure of Separation by Limiting Authority 
The first option—segregating, or limiting, authority—focuses on 
separating how tribal and state authority overlap in terms of subject 
matter, as opposed to how they overlap in terms of person and place.  
Pursuing this option would likely involve some type of negotiated 
agreement between tribes, states, and the federal government.250  The 
specific language, form, and process of adoption for any law segregat-
ing authority is beyond the scope of the present article, but using 
some form of affirmative law seems necessary under this approach 
 
 250. COHEN, supra note 45, at 589–94. 
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given that the federal government has proven unwilling to maintain a 
coherent sovereign boundary.  Affirmative law would, to a large 
extent, remove the placement and solidity of the tribal-state boundary 
from the schizophrenia of federal Indian law jurisprudence.  Howev-
er, the adoption of any law changing the sovereignty or territory of a 
government would certainly involve considerable political, electoral, 
and procedural hurdles at all levels to say the least, hurdles that tribes 
would not have complete control over—a factor weighing against 
pursuit of this option.  Beyond these hurdles, such agreements would 
likely cut both ways.  On the one hand, the agreement itself would 
implicitly acknowledge the sovereignty of the tribe.  On the other 
hand, reaching agreement would likely require additional cessions of 
sovereign authority, territory, or resources.251 
Whatever form the proposed limiting law takes, it should employ 
a retained-rights paradigm, similar to how authority is divided 
between the states and the federal government under the Tenth 
Amendment.  For instance, the agreement might read: “The powers 
not delegated to the United States or the State by this agreement, nor 
prohibited by it to the Tribe, are reserved to the Tribe, or to the 
Tribe’s citizens.”   
The idea here is to leave as little authority in the hands of the 
state and federal governments as possible, leaving the “vast inherency” 
to the tribe.  Unfortunately, this two-tiered limitation has an inherent 
flaw.  Even if governing authority can be split three ways, it is an open 
question how much authority will be left to the tribe. 
b. Comprehensive Separation 
To pursue the second option—comprehensive political separa-
tion from the state—tribes need to take steps to sever the connections 
between state government, reservation citizens, and reservation 
territory.  This will require action on several fronts, each focusing on 
 
 251. Some scholars have heralded intergovernmental agreements as a means to 
achieve an adequate division of authority and the future of tribal-state coexistence, 
borrowing from the example of the use of such agreements in the state-to-state 
context.  See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country, 53 
FED. LAW. 38, 42–43 (2006); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies” 
Model of Tribal-State Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73, 82–87 (2007).  Certainly such 
agreements help solve discrete problems and present opportunities for cost sharing.  
However, the viability of the agreements as a means of reaching broader issues of 
sovereign division is questionable.  See COHEN, supra note 45, at 589–94; Ezra Rosser, 
Caution, Cooperative Agreements, and the Actual State of Things: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 
42 TULSA L. REV. 57, 62–73 (2006). 
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ending the ways tribal and state authority overlap with regard to 
person and place.  The first important nexus that must be separated is 
dual citizenship. 
i. Separating Tribal Citizen from State Citizen 
As stated earlier, reservation citizens consent to state authority by 
voting in state elections.252  By living on the reservation, they bring that 
authority inside tribal territory. Unfortunately, tribes have no control 
over who the surrounding state considers eligible to vote in state 
elections, i.e. is a state citizen.  Any effort to create civil or criminal 
penalties associated with participation in state politics would likely 
invite challenges under voting rights laws—misguided though they 
may be—at a time when tribes are better off keeping decisions about 
their sovereignty out of court.  That said, tribes still retain considera-
ble discretion in determining their own citizenship.253  This situation 
raises the possibility of disenrollment as a tool.  As controversial as 
such a measure would surely be, it is not without precedent. 
Certain voluntary actions done with intent to renounce citizen-
ship will result in the loss of U.S. citizenship.254  Such actions include 
becoming a citizen of another country, declaring allegiance to 
another country, serving in government office of another country 
when such service requires an oath of allegiance, or formally renounc-
ing allegiance to a State Department Official while abroad.255  
Conversely, those seeking U.S. citizenship via naturalization must 
pledge “to renounce and abjure absolutely and entirely all allegiance 
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of 
whom or which the applicant was before a subject or citizen” and “to 
bear true faith and allegiance to the [Constitution and the laws of the 
 
 252. See supra Part IV.A. 
 253. See generally Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 49 (1978) 
(upholding tribal ordinance denying membership in tribe to children of female 
members who married outside the tribe while extending membership to children of 
male members who married outside the tribe); Red Bird v. United States, 203 U.S. 76, 
95 (1906) (affirming that only such white persons as intermarried with Cherokees by 
blood prior to November 1, 1875, were entitled to any share in the Cherokee 
property, or to be enrolled for that purpose); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 223 
(1897) (affirming the validity of Chickasaw decision to withdrawing tribal citizenship 
from wife, and therefore husband); Smith v. Babbit, 100 F.3d 556, 558 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(discussing sovereignty of Indian tribes in determining tribal membership). 
 254. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (2006). 
 255. Id. 
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United States]”256  Other countries have similar statutes.257  These acts 
provide a strong indication that the individual in question has 
withdrawn consent to being a citizen or has transferred allegiances. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has specifically held that voting in a 
foreign election does not constitute such an act,258 but that has not 
always been the case259 and the difference between the voluntary act of 
voting and the voluntary acts currently resulting in loss of citizenship 
seems scant.  Citizenship in a country is usually a pre-requisite to 
voting in a country.  Citizens of one American state who subsequently 
vote in the elections of another state generally lose their citizenship in 
the first state.260  Some tribes historically had similar laws.  The 
Iroquois considered participation in another government’s affairs 
grounds to exclude those doing so from leadership within the 
Iroquois Confederacy.261 
Tribes could adopt similar rules to resolve the dual-citizenship 
problem by automatically disenrolling any reservation citizen who votes 
in a state election, files to run for state office, or serves in elected state 
office.262  A preemptive measure may seem severe, but any law 
requiring affirmative enforcement will likely leave the vast majority of 
dual citizenship cases intact, even if a tribe expends considerable 
 
 256. Id. § 1448(a) (alteration in original). 
 257. See, e.g., Yousef T. Jabareen, Constitution Building and Equality in Deeply-Divided 
Societies: The Case of the Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 345, 370 
n.82 (2008) (discussing the Israeli requirement of renouncing foreign citizenship); 
Annelies Lottman, No Direction Home: Nationalism and Statelessness in the Baltics, 43 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 503, 506–514 (2008) (discussing the legislative schemes used to address 
citizenship questions by the Baltic states upon declaring independence from the 
Soviet Union); John Rockwell Snowden et al., American Indian Sovereignty and 
Naturalization: It’s a Race Thing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 171, 181–84 (2001) (discussing the 
history of the U.S. citizenship laws); Peter J. Spiro, Questioning Barriers to Naturaliza-
tion, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 479, 504–08 (1999) (discussing the requirement of the 
renunciation oath for citizenship in the United States and its gradual move towards 
ineffectiveness). 
 258. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967).  
 259. Id. 
 260. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.020(6) (2009); ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.043(3) (2009); 
GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 3 §9124(f) (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-13(7) (2009); N.M. 
STAT. § 1-1-7(H)(1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.02(H) (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 
247.035(e) (2009); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2814(h) (2007); WIS. STAT. § 6.10(10) (2004); 
Klumker v. Van Allred, 811 P.2d 75, 79 (N.M. 1991).  
 261. See Chief Irving Powless, Jr., supra note 46, at 1083; Porter, The Demise, supra 
note 13, at 159; George, supra note 52; Hauptman, supra note 52.  
 262. Tribes could enforce such laws by regularly comparing tribal citizenship 
records with county voting records. 
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resources on policing.263 
Reasons exist for adopting a more comprehensive law to control 
dual citizenship, one that would disenroll any tribal citizen, regardless 
of residence, who votes in a state election, files to run for state office, 
or serves in elected state office.  First, participation by off-reservation 
tribal citizens implies some level of acceptance of state authority by 
the tribe because all tribal citizens, regardless of residence, constitute 
part of the tribe.  While some may see little harm in voting by off-
reservation tribal citizens, consider that resident aliens in the United 
States, and United State citizens abroad, generally do not vote in the 
elections of the countries in which they reside.  The same can be said 
of U.S. citizens from one state who temporarily reside in another, 
such as college students or military personnel.  Second, and more 
importantly, off-reservation tribal citizens who participate in tribal 
elections represent an inverse corollary to reservation citizens who 
participate in state elections.  Specifically, off-reservation tribal 
citizens who vote in tribal elections participate in making laws that 
affect the reservation, and therefore not necessarily themselves or 
where they live, including decisions about the allocation of govern-
ment resources.  
The dilemma presented by off-reservation tribal citizen voting 
deepens because most agree that off-reservation citizens have some 
degree of connection with their tribal homeland and allegiance to 
their tribal government.  Those who left the reservation generally did 
so for reasons unrelated to allegiance to the tribe, or investment in its 
well-being, for example school or employment.  Consider a hypotheti-
cal tribe that lives “within driving distance” of a large city where many 
tribal citizens have migrated.  Assume the tribe has (a) a high 
incidence of diabetes, (b) bad reservation roads, (c) a rundown 
school building with too few teachers, and (d) a significant budget 
surplus.  The tribe could (1) distribute the funds as per capita 
payments, (2) invest in the reservation’s roads, (3) remodel the 
school, (4) hire more teachers, (5) create a language retention 
program, (6) build a dialysis center on the reservation, or (7) build a 
dialysis center in the nearby city.  There are no objectively “right” or 
“wrong” choices, but how tribal citizens respond to this situation, and 
 
 263. Given the Supreme Court’s use of participation-based reasoning to limit 
tribal authority over non-citizens living on the reservations, tribes might consider ways 
to allow non-citizen reservation residents to participate in reservation government in 
some fashion.  Unfortunately, such a discussion is beyond the scope of the present 
paper. 
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others like it over time, will affect the tribe’s sovereign character and 
whether surrounding governments acknowledge and validate that 
sovereign character.   
Recognizing this problem, some tribes have responded by requir-
ing voters to reside on the reservation or requiring in-person voting 
on the reservation.264  Tribes not comfortable with completely severing 
the relationship with off-reservation tribal citizens could fashion a 
new, intermediate category of political relation, possibly categorized 
as “members.”  The exact nature of this intermediate political 
relationship would depend on the individual circumstances of the 
tribe in question.  A full discussion of the possibilities here is beyond 
the scope of the present paper, but one possible configuration would 
give individuals in this category access to tribal services and benefits, 
but exclude them from suffrage.  This structure would have the added 
benefit of preserving federal funding levels.265 
Given the severity of disenrollment, significant post-deprivation 
due process protections would be appropriate.  Tribes should 
consider carefully the burdens of persuasion and standard of proof 
involved in any post-disenrollment hearing, taking into account the 
reliability of state and tribal voting records, among other factors.  
Provisions might also be made to allow disenrolled individuals to re-
enroll on certain conditions, such as expiration of a minimum period 
of disenrollment, tribal service, an oath of allegiance, or some 
combination thereof.266  Tribes adopting such a law should also set its 
effective date far enough in the future to allow tribal members to 
remove their name from the state voter rolls beforehand.267  The 
effects of disenrollment also should be limited to the individual who 
registers to vote in a non-tribal election, avoiding any impact on the 
tribal citizenship of relatives or descendents. 
 
 264. See, e.g., CONST. AND BY-LAWS OF THE ALABAMA AND COUSHATTA TRIBES OF 
TEXAS, art. V, § 1, available at http://thorpe.ou.edu./IRA.html; Oneida Tribe of 
Indians of Wisconsin, ONEIDA CODE OF LAWS, ch. 2.8 § B, available at 
http://www.oneidanation.org/government/lawsandpolicies/oneidacodeoflaws.aspx. 
 265. See Margo S. Brownell, Who Is An Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question 
at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 276 (2001) (discussing 
census calculations and the effect on federal funding for Native American tribes). 
 266. It warrants mentioning that disenrollment does not affect the culture of a 
disenrolled individual, although many will surely feel that way.  The inability to vote 
in tribal elections will not affect disenrollees’ ability to live their lives according to 
traditional customs, beliefs, and values. 
 267. See generally KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.0452(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2008); MD. 
CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-501(1) (LexisNexis 2009); N.Y. Election Law § 5-400(1)g 
(McKinney 2008). 
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It is important that tribes only disenroll citizens who actually vote 
in state elections, and allow them to register to vote with the state 
without consequence.  Not registering to vote in state elections would 
have the additional consequence of making tribal citizens ineligible to 
vote in federal elections, a collateral effect with bothersome implica-
tions that need to be avoided.  States set voter qualifications, thereby 
controlling who votes, subject to Constitutional limitations.268  States 
do not separate qualifications for state elections from qualifications 
for federal elections.  Hence, anyone who does not register to vote in 
state elections becomes ineligible to vote in federal elections.  The 
prospect of foregoing federal suffrage should give pause to pro-tribal 
interests.  Federal legislation, policies, and programs affect much of 
reservation life, a strong argument for continued federal participa-
tion.269  Tribes’ political/diplomatic leverage relies in large part on 
their ability to affect federal elections via reliable voting blocks.   
ii. Separating Tribal Territory from State Territory 
Disenrolling individuals who vote in state elections ends the 
problem of dual citizenship, but disenrollees living on the reservation 
could still participate in state elections while there.  The same can be 
said for non-tribal citizens living on the reservation, of which there are 
many.  These territorial aspects have to be dealt with as well, but with 
different measures.   
To begin, tribes need to legislatively oppose the implied annexa-
tion that arises from the establishment of state voting and legislative 
 
 268. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
384 U.S. 641, 647 (1966). 
 269. Some states exercise substantial law making and enforcement powers over 
reservation territories pursuant to Public Law 280, suggesting a similar argument in 
favor of continued tribal participation in state political processes in such cases.  
However, the powers exercised by states and the implications of participation in state 
political processes differ from those in the federal context making state participation 
inadvisable if the affected tribes wish to avoid further losses of sovereignty.  First, in 
contrast to the many tribes and tribal peoples who consented to federal citizenship, 
the vast majority of tribes and tribal peoples opposed, and continue to oppose, 
incorporation into the surrounding states.  See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying 
text.  Second, precedent exists for dual citizenship with the federal sovereign.  
American federalism, if fully embraced in the tribal context, would avoid sovereign 
competition through limitation of federal authority, and thereby avoid erosion of the 
tribal sovereignty.  See supra Parts IV.B., IV.C.1.  No comparable mechanism for 
dividing sovereignty three ways (tribal-federal-state) presently exists.  Without such a 
limitation, tribal sovereignty will suffer.  See supra Parts IV.A–B.  Even if such a 
limitation could be devised, a three-way split of authority would leave fewer matters 
affecting tribal citizens and lands in tribal control. 
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districts on reservation lands.  To do this, tribes need to adopt laws 
prohibiting the use of ballots within the reservation that include 
candidates for election to state office or measures concerning the 
adoption of proposed state laws.  Tribes may need to seize voting 
machines, ballots, and other equipment as a regulatory measure to 
prevent votes from being cast,270 but need not impose criminal 
penalties for activities associated with state voting within tribal 
territory.  Any regulatory method pursued by a tribe needs to 
anticipate challenges based on existing civil rights and voting laws, 
initiated or supported by any of the individuals and organizations with 
vested interests in continued on-reservation state voting.  Note that 
ballots with only federal candidates and proposed laws should be 
allowed.271  Customizing reservation ballots to include only federal 
candidates and laws would be no more difficult than the creation of 
the paper ballots used in each state county.  Each county’s ballots only 
include those candidates and measures applying to that county.  
Where states use electronic voting, this customization should be 
easier. 
The last, and most problematic, step in bringing equitable cohe-
rence to territorial sovereignty in the tribal context is severing the 
legal connection that makes tribal authority within reservations 
contingent on the ownership status of the land.  Ownership and 
governance have been largely separated for ages outside manorial or 
communist states.272  Only in the reservation context have ownership 
and governance been unified.  Non-Indian interests established this 
connection in an effort to rationalize an unethical annexation of 
territory via tortured logic out of sync with basic American sovereign 
concept.  The situation arose, for the most part, as a result of the 
General Allotment Act—a unilateral act designed to take land from 
Indians and destroy tribes,273 a policy clearly at odds with any concept 
of government by consent.  Changing the law would be consistent 
with a genuine abandonment of the allotment and termination 
policies. 
Unfortunately, this answer is also politically difficult.  Non-tribal 
 
 270. Any equipment or materials seized could be returned on the promise no 
further attempts would be made to establish polling places within tribal territory. 
 271. If tribes continue participating in federal political processes, tribes need seek 
a segregation of authority between the federal and tribal governments similar to the 
Tenth Amendment.  See supra Parts IV.A–B., IV.C.1. 
 272. See generally Monette, Governing Private Property in Indian Country, supra note 
167; Richard Monette, Imposing Communism, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 991 (2008). 
 273. See supra Part II.E.1. 
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reservation residents in all probability would strongly oppose such a 
measure because it would make them subject to a government of 
which they could never be citizens.274  States would also oppose such a 
law because a change in the status of these lands would have a sizeable 
impact on ad valorem tax revenues.275 
V. CONCLUSION 
The question of whether tribal participation in non-tribal politics 
is a welcome wagon or Trojan horse is best answered in time-honored 
law school fashion—”it depends.”  Both positions are potentially 
“right.”  If the goal is incorporation into the non-tribal body politic, 
then the efforts of native peoples to obtain non-tribal voting rights 
and protect their ability to exercise those rights have been great 
victories, much like the victories achieved by other disadvantaged 
groups such as African Americans, women, and non-property owners.  
On the other hand, if the goal is asserting and maintaining tribes’ 
status as separate sovereigns, then the same acts constitute grave losses 
and grave dangers.  The one certainty is that trying to have it both 
ways is likely untenable if the Founders’ ideas about imperium in 
imperio carry any real-world force.  The pattern of tribes’ losses of 
sovereignty, reflected throughout the body of Indian law one case at a 
time, suggests that imperium in imperio is indeed to blame to some 
extent. 
In his decision in Harrison v. Laveen, Justice Udall wrote that “[t]o 
deny the right to vote, where one is legally entitled to do so, is to do 
violence to the principles of freedom and equality.”276  The inverse 
also bears truth: extending the right to vote to those who reject the 
basic premise that voting constitutes consent to be governed also does 
violence to the principles of freedom and equality.  The same can be 
 
 274. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 227, at 114–17. 
 275. See Press Release, Sen. Schumer, Rep. Arcuri: Local Communities, Taxpayer Must 
Have Better Protections Against Land Into Trust, U.S. FED. NEWS (July 15, 2009), available 
at 2009 WLNR 13408750 (“‘I have long expressed my serious reservations about the 
land into trust process,’ said Senator Schumer.  ‘One of my fundamental concerns is 
that taking land into trust will deprive local governments of much needed revenue to 
pay for schools, road maintenance, and other crucial county functions, and that the 
gap will have to be made up by local taxpayers.  This bill will ensure that counties are 
reimbursed for any possible property tax base loss, and provide some measure of 
protection against these decisions.’”); Brian Barber, Council to Vote Next Week on Arkan-
sas River Land Measure, TULSA WORLD, July 21, 2009, available at http://www.tulsaworld
.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=298&articleid=20090721_298_0_TlasCt632255. 
 276. 196 P.2d 456, 459 (1949). 
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said for seeking the right to vote under the same circumstances.  
Participation in state politics by reservation citizens represents a 
hypocritical position inconsistent with fundamental American 
democratic concepts.  Tribes need to recognize this conflict and take 
commensurate remedial action.  Commensurate action does not 
mean action based on idealistic goals.  Rather it is what is necessary to 
counteract the situation with which tribes are faced.  Commensurate 
action must be determined by what will sufficiently respond to the 
situation at hand, not the ease or difficulty of the action required.  It 
should be the starting point from which to systematically choose the 
best possible course from many alternatives.  Looking outside this set 
of alternatives is to consider options that will not achieve the ultimate 
goal being sought. 
In this instance, tribes face the consequences of continued partic-
ipation in federal and state elections.  If consent by participation 
represents a subtext to the sovereign struggle between tribes and 
states, and the Founders’ fears regarding dual sovereignty have any 
validity, continued participation by tribes will eventually hollow out 
tribal sovereignty.  The general downward trajectory of tribal sove-
reignty suggests these concepts are indeed at play.  The progression 
has largely followed the incremental pattern predicted by Anti-
Federalist thinkers.  There have been plateaus and small victories, but 
overall, tribes have lost ground. 
To take commensurate action, tribes need to keep tribal, state, 
and federal sovereignty from conflicting.  If we assume federal 
lawmaking with regard to tribes will continue regardless of reserved 
treaty rights, tribes have a legitimate claim to participation in that 
process.  However, a limitation on federal sovereignty over tribes 
needs to be established if the federal-tribal relationship is ever to 
reach an equitable, sustainable equilibrium, and not result in the 
asphyxiation of tribal sovereignty.  On the state level, tribes can either 
combine with the surrounding states to form one sovereign, or create 
more separation between themselves and the surrounding states.  
Tribal-state separation can be achieved via a limitation similar to the 
Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, or by greater respect for 
sovereign boundaries, similar to the respect given to the boundaries 
between states.  The present jurisdictional patchwork is confusing, 
tortured, and out of line with basic sovereign concept.  Consequently, 
the solution must bear an opposing amount of clarity, if not ease of 
execution.   
One way tribes can advocate for the changes proposed by this 
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article is to base their arguments on the basic tenets of sustainable, 
equitable government accepted by most Americans as objective truths.  
If government by consent is an objective truth, it has to be true for 
everyone, including tribal peoples.  Similarly, if the dangers of human 
self-interest and consolidated federal power are objective truths, then 
they exist everywhere, and everyone needs protection from them, 
tribal and non-tribal alike.   
Analogizing the conceptual tensions found in Indian law to the 
struggles faced by the Founders in forming the American republic 
might be one way to convince non-tribal people of the need for 
uniform application of these concepts.  If non-tribal people can be 
convinced of this analogy, they would have to concede that the 
present state of affairs utterly fails to meet the “government by 
consent of the governed” ideal, and embodies the polar opposite of 
the limited federal power contemplated by the Tenth Amendment.  
Unless non-tribal peoples are ready to assert that the Founders’ 
concerns about government by consent, imperium in imperio, and the 
need for the Tenth Amendment were completely without merit, it 
would seem that they have to concede the need to establish a limit on 
federal and state authority in the tribal context, and give tribal people 
increased autonomy. 
Some will respond to this article by arguing that the benefits of 
participation in state and national politics show the need for contin-
ued participation.  Unfortunately, this approach only suggests which 
choice tribes should make, not whether a choice needs to be made.  
Others will say the analysis this article offers fails to acknowledge “the 
actual state of things;” however, that is a matter of perspective.  It is 
axiomatic that tribes and tribal citizens need to make the best of what 
they have and not strive for unrealistic goals.  That said, tribes and 
tribal citizens still need to be aware of the broader implications of the 
choices they make within that caveat and strive for meaningful goals.  
Just as nature abhors a vacuum, the law and society abhor hypocrisy 
and inconsistency.  The gravity of coherent doctrine prevails over time 
versus the political exigencies or opportunities of the day.  Societal, 
political, and legal pressures created by policies inconsistent with 
fundamental concepts are eventually resolved by reconciling the 
inconsistencies. 
Tribes need to take control of how the tension between tribal 
participation in non-tribal politics and the fundamental American 
concepts herein discussed will eventually resolve.  In the past, non-
tribal interests have blithely abandoned fundamental tenets of 
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American governmental philosophy and law when it comes to tribal 
peoples.  Things that would be unthinkable in non-tribal contexts 
somehow become acceptable, if not clearly appropriate.  Somehow, 
“consent of the governed” just does not matter when it comes to 
making native people citizens, acquiring tribal lands, or allowing 
states to collect tax revenues outside state borders.  Now, if it takes 
more effort to rationalize abandoning closely held tenets than to 
abide by them, non-tribal interests will certainly start embracing the 
concept of consent by participation in the tribal context more fully 
when they realize it can be used to eliminate what they perceive as the 
inconvenience of tribal sovereignty.   
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